Some thoughts dissecting the Rasmussen's #NATO #Ukraine proposal. The context:

> Those advocating for Ukraineโ€™s Nato membership have been hamstrung by the near-impossibility of a country at war being offered membership, since under Natoโ€™s article 5 clause of collective self-defence, all Nato member states are required to come to the active defence of the country in conflict. Nato membership for all of Ukraine now would in effect be a notice to Russia by Nato that it was about to go to war with Moscow.

The Rasmussen's proposal:

> By excluding from Nato territory held by Russia, the threat of a Russia-Nato conflict would be reduced, Rasmussen argues.

A reasonable question arises, what's exactly "territory held by Russia"? Remember, in 2022 Russia unilaterally declared four regions of Ukraine part of Russian Federation. This includes towns liberated by Ukraine, such as Kherson, and, most absurdly, even those where Russian soldiers never even put they foot, like Zaporizhzhia โ€” or Avdiivka, now besieged by Russia.

I assume Rasmussen doesn't care about these declarations, because otherwise his proposal wouldn't make any sense. But in any case they must be taken into account if the purpose of the Ukraine's membership is deterrence, rather than indirect declaration of war.

So does that mean these regions would be excluded entirely? That, on the first look, that sounds like abandoning them to Russia.

But here's the next passage which clarifies Rasmussen's thinking a bit:

> Rasmussen denied the move would freeze the conflict, ceding Ukrainian territory to Russia. He said: โ€œThe absolute credibility of article 5 guarantees would deter Russia from mounting attacks inside the Ukrainian territory inside Nato and so free up Ukrainian forces to go to the frontline."

And that would make a lot of sense, because NATO protection for 80% of Ukraine territory effectively expands the current Ukraine's logistics hub from behind the EU border ~1000 km further east. Not to mention economic and humanitarian factor, where NATO umbrella would make living and making business in Kyiv just as safe as in Warsaw today.

But here's a problem I can't crack: if Ukraine enters NATO, and continues fighting for its territories beyond the "protected" grounds, doesn't that make it โ€” a NATO country โ€” at war with Russia? Rasmussen knows way more than me about NATO and international relations, but this bit it somehow missing from the article...

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/...
Ex-Nato chief proposes Ukraine joins without Russian-occupied territories

Former secretary general says partial membership would warn Russia it cannot stop Ukraine joining the alliance

The Guardian

@kravietz
Obviously it would be a NATO country at war with Russia. Like USA was a NATO country at war with Iraq. Not covered by Article 5. (No further comparison between the situations intended).

In this case, Ukraine would be partially covered by Article 5 which is not unprecedented. Ceuta and Hawaii are parts of NATO countries, but not covered.

@notsoloud

But if article 5 would indeed work for the remaining part of Ukraine, that would be a huge win already - first, no need to keep forces tied e.g. at the border with Belarus, and just focus on the current front line; also, much shorter logistics.

@kravietz
Yep. It sounds really weird at first, then it's genius ๐Ÿ˜†

The real issue is to create a credible deterrent. A bunch of international NATO units spread as tripwires in strategic places should go a long way. And then, as the front lines inch forward, take one Hromada after another under the umbrella.

@notsoloud @kravietz
How would that work, really?

The first missile that lands on Ukraine controlled territory triggers Article 5?
Every square meter Ukraine takes back automatically becomes protected?

Or not, because NATO countries don't want to fight this war, and whole of Luhansk, Donesrk, Crimea and Zaporizhzia stay a gray zone under conflict?

It seems to me the model has to assume that russia would escalate anyway, so avoiding the fight is not a long term option.

@osma
There would have to be a specific area covered by Article 5.

Extending the area would require more or less the same procedure as enlarging NATO.

@kravietz

@osma

Well, that Russia will fire a rocket in its usual idiotic "it wasn't us" manner is quite obvious, and all depends on what NATO would do in response.

At the same time, it's a double edged sword, because such an attack would create a clear reason for massively increased NATO presence on the "protected" territory of Ukraine, well beyond the current levels.

Good luck firing an "Iskander" at an actual US logistics battalion located somewhere around Vinnitsa. I guess Russia could say farewell to its aviation and navy in the Black Sea region pretty quick...

@notsoloud
@kravietz
This might also be a "big ask" to change the conversation: Okay, if you're not sending troops to Ukraine, at least give us what we need to win
@osma