@HcInfosec @jeroen Yes, and every technical expert who has seriously studied online voting as come to the same conclusion about the risks, because there are fundamental problems and requirements that preclude building an Internet voting system sufficient for civil elections.

It's not that scientists don't think Internet voting would be nice. Just as physicists don't think perpetual motion machines wouldn't be terrific. It's just that they understand fundamental reasons we can't make them.

@HcInfosec @jeroen You want an Internet voting system? You have two choices. One is to relax some of the basic requirements and civil rights associated with voting (at least in the US), such as the secret ballot. The other option is to have elections where we can never be sure who actually won, and that are vulnerable to disruption by anyone connected to the Internet.

Neither option seems great.

@kallekn @mattblaze @HcInfosec @jeroen Scale, primarily (In the most recent election, more than 50% voted electronically, and that meant 312,181 ballots electronically.).

That said, look at the two 2019 maps of Estonia voting breakdown on Wikipedia ( https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_in_Estonia ) - those two images seem to indicate that voting electronically seems to heavily favour one party more than if the votes were done with paper ballots.

@AT1ST @kallekn @mattblaze @jeroen No not scale, is it?
If I would state what most it people state as reasons for not wanting #evoting it's probably:
1- how to make sure every vote is counted correctly. For that you need some kind of proof where you can after counting re-count and be sure all votes are counted correctly. In analog voting you have the paper trail: meaning you can count ballots by hand or machine and re-count also.
2- and you need to do this without knowledge who voted what (privacy)
3- and you need to verify everyone who votes is entitled to and only votes once

Voting electronically has the risk of:
A- software making mistakes or of course being manipulated
B- so you need a system with proof that counting was done right
C- and apparantly in the papers all others will send us this is explained😎

I hope they can have the decency to explain in a few lines.

@HcInfosec @kallekn @mattblaze @jeroen I mean, there's also the possibility of random candidates suddenly getting 4096 more votes electronics than they actually got [ https://youtu.be/AaZ_RSt0KP8 ].

...And that's the best case scenario for why something went wrong with the count.

@AT1ST @kallekn @mattblaze @jeroen My first answer to all this was: you need to compare two systems. Analog voting systems have problems too, like we can see in the USA where they try to make it hard for people to vote.

My conclusion for now, not having red all papers of course, it that mail-in voting seems more secure in practice than #evoting

But of course I don't accept that #evoting can't be secure. I have posted a solution that might work.
I would say have an open-source challenge with a pretty big bounty between universities to design a system. (God I hope they didn't do that yet)