Digiaktivist Märt Põder on juba pikki aastaid omanud suurt huvi Eesti e-valimiste suhtes. 2015. aasta Riigikogu valimistel proovis ta, kas võrdväärselt pabersedeliga hääletamisele saab ka e-hääletades sedelit rikkuda. Äsja toimunud valimiste puhul katsetas Põder, kas tal õnnestub anda e-hääl isetehtud koodirea abil. Põder on ühtlasi e-hääletamise vaatleja ning koostas oma blogis ülevaate tähelepanekutest, kus tõi […]
@tramm @janantos @noaasm_ @dSour We have to distinguish two situations. One is where the container does not correspond to the format that the official voting application provides. The other situation is when the contianer looks correct, but the decrypted vote is a garbage.
With the latter everything is quite clear -- it is similar to the situation where a paper ballot with a garbage statement is slipped into the ballot box. It is an invalid vote.
The former is more interesting. It is possible that someone (pick your guess, who ;)) wrote their own voting application, but failed to debug it properly. Still, the cryptogram might contain a valid vote.
I am not entirely sure what the best solution here is. One may argue that, legally, correct votes should be counted, but this might prove difficult technically. Gathering such encrypted ballots separately and attempting to decrypt them using a different procedure is not a good option. It would be hard to protect secrecy of those few votes. It would also prolong the counting procedure (and we all know how the society loves late arrival of the e-votes).
My recommendation -- if you want to make sure that your e-vote gets properly counted, use the official voting application. If you do not trust it to encrypt your vote correctly, then also use the verification tool.