Posted a new blog post on the #LastPass update and what we learn about their breach: https://palant.info/2023/02/28/lastpass-breach-update-the-few-additional-bits-of-information/
Spoiler: it isn’t a whole lot. The LastPass statement once again raises more questions than it answers.
· We now know that a LastPass employee accessed critical company data from their home computer. I wonder whether LastPass mentions it in an attempt to shift blame to the employee (and the vulnerable third-party software they used). If that’s the case, they failed – this demonstrates a clear issue with their security practices.
· The timeline of the breach remains unclear. I *guess* that the attackers spent 10 weeks from August to October exfiltrating data from LastPass’ AWS storage. But that’s only one way of reading their statement.
· Contrary to what LastPass previously said, companies using Federated Login Services are at an increased risk from this breach. As Chaim Sanders noticed (https://medium.com/@chaim_sanders/its-all-bad-news-an-update-on-how-the-lastpass-breach-affects-lastpass-sso-9b4fa64466f6), LastPass admitted leaking K2 component of the hidden master password in the breach. With K1 being accessible to any company employee, it isn’t that hard to get by. And then no bruteforcing will be necessary to decrypt all of the company’s LastPass data.
· On the product side, no security improvements are visible. The default iterations count has been increased to 600,000 but users are still expected to update this setting manually. LastPass once again promises business customers automated updating at some point in future, yet so far they didn’t even manage to implement a simple warning.
Update: Found another LastPass document providing specifics on the timeline. So the attackers stole backups ranging from August 20 to September 16, 2022. Finally something specific. This also means however that by the time LastPass finally warned the users in December 2022, the attackers already had a three months head start at cracking passwords.