@Alon vacation will make me miss your webcast tomorrow but hope you can answer the following questions (recording or here):

1. How are other countries structuring advanced ROW reinforcing? In terms of project timeline and organization. It was perpetual in my time in NYC construction that there was an DOB/Fire inspector shortage. Seems like something that should be scheduled years in advance of any shovel in NYC. The state could easily vest MTA with the legal ability to enforce NYC code. 1/n

2. Given the sheer difficulty the report describes with launch boxes it seems like everything should be cut-and-cover or the TBMs should never stop (or be decommissioned). The later option retaining station access issues.
3. Just a random memory that proving compliance with my 450 or so page capital construction subcontract was a complete pain in the ass and I only had a relatively simple corporate structure. The larger firms with foreign owners/branches/Iran disinvestment act/BDS Israel stuff must be insane to comply with.

4. Is there really that much difficulty to unmapped utilities? Things are never constructed exactly to drawings (I always laughed at Revit for this reason), and as-builts are only ever line schematics (useful) for tradespeople.

I assume the utility relocation problem is again coordinating a good quick response rather than the actual labor.

5. Seems like civil servants need to be trusted at a lower level than... The governor... To implement carrots and sticks against individual contractors. This would come at the expense of 0 risk of corruption mechanisms.
6. Ha! Firecom fire-alarm and their ancient tech would cause that. I worked with their owners a few times (they just sold). Since they were a manufacturer and installer they would bid a proprietary system below costs, get the deal, and they absolutely screw over the city/state/PANYNJ on maintenance contracts.

Onto the analysis section.
7. The amount of times I was told by city officials (as it relates to FCC licenses) that the city was an entity of the state and so the state can do whatever the hell it wanted to...

Again, seems like an empowered MTA civil servant could have forced or ignored city stakeholders.

8. So much of this reads as delays (and costs) induced by one artificial sub sub entity of the state arguing with another sub sub entity of the state on whose spreadsheet state money is coming out of?
9. Procurement. On the aforementioned subcontract I definitely did have to put in some scheduled costs. Frankly some didn't make sense to me but we had a schedule. I do not know if that was a prime contract requirement though

10. Buy everything at once approach. This really is pervasive throughout the MTA. Recently saw a press release for transit wireless in tunnels, bragging about how the MTA was getting 48(?) strands of glass to every station to be future proof as part of the deal.

That is more bandwidth than transatlantic cables, but every single system in MTA will want its own dedicated glass rather than share. So they will run out.

11. So the stations are expensive in significant part because sub sub sub organizations can't work together operationally thus they need their own space. Seems like GCM!

Endemic throughout. I wonder what the smallest unit of sub organization work together refusal is.

@Alon detailed report and good work from everyone. In line with recent "costs do not matter" philosophy I am curious how much of the costs delta you could obviously attribute time delays?

To ask it in a infinite subsidy hypothetical way: if costs do not matter, will infinite money actually deliver more subway faster? Are there specific areas where more money = better faster stronger?

One area that does come to mind is a Signapore style paid and empowered/qualified MTA project leadership.

@ConnorC 1. Delays generally come from procurement bullshit coming from the agency or from obstructive utilities.

2. Infinite money is infinite OPM for obstructive utilities, parks, NIMBYs, consultants, engineers, etc. Think of it this way: by Dutch standards, let alone Italian ones, New York is making infinite money available for capital expansion.

3. Singapore is a high-construction cost city and is one of the origins of the globalized system of privatization of risk. Do not emulate it.

@Alon reference Signapore. I was more referring to a competitively paid and empowered civil service and engineering level with bonus (or firing) incentives. In general, famously the PM, but not the MRT I guess...

Should have been more descriptive.

But on the other things infinite money = incentivises infinite delays?

@ConnorC A PM who gets millions of dollars a year in salary is not bonus incentives, it's looting. Singapore is generally very good at doing this "look how efficient we are" marketing and then at the end it's just run as a not particularly efficient family business that managed to monopolize a piece of valuable land. (And yes, I will mention it today.)