@dangillmor One of the particularly logically tortured aspects of that op-ed is that the example he cites - Oath Keepers on January 6th - is, as he even acknowledges, a case where the FBI actually got the evidence it needed (almost certainly from either a seized phone or an informant/cooperating defendant). Signal protects against real-time communications intercepts, not being betrayed by co-conspirators.

@dangillmor And indeed, it's unlikely that the real-time communications intercepts that Signal protects against would have been available to the FBI in advance of January 6th, no matter the encryption involved. They would have needed a warrant on probable cause, and since they didn't yet even know about the January 6th conspiracy, they wouldn't have had one.

@dangillmor The op-ed's complaint seems to be that Signal doesn't gratuitously log everyone's communications content in case law enforcement wants it in the future. But neither does virtually any other real-time communications system - voice telephony, SMS, tin-can-and-string, or conversations in parks. Real-time communication is, by definition, ephemeral, whether encrypted or not.

@mattblaze @dangillmor It’s more than a little concerning if he really wants LE to have the kinds of capabilities he alludes to.

@jvagle @dangillmor It's like he's trying so hard to make encryption a boogeyman that he didn't actually think about what he was suggesting.

@mattblaze @jvagle @dangillmor I'm confused. Is it still 1993? Are we going to resurrect ITAR restrictions on encryption again as well?