So putting my guessing hat on; it'll cover:

* Radiation/nuclear safety
* Indefinite extension of Grain Deal
* Price restrictions on Russian energy
* Release of prisoners and deportees -- POWs; forcible deportees; children
* Restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity
* Withdrawal of Russian forces
* Reparations for damages to be paid by Russia
* Funding and technology to restore damaged infrastructure and offset environmental damage
* Effective security guarantees (the Kyiv Security Compact)

I strongly suspect neither he nor the WH expect reciprocation from R MFA (tho curious if they'll even get to meetings); but US has been pushing pretty hard for UA to at least publicly appear open to a peace deal to offset Russian propaganda and some US/Global concerns that a peace deal would be available, but for UA/US "obstruction"
If you're looking for the long-form of why all this is going on, why nobody in US/UA leadership think it's going anywhere, and why they're having to publicly do it anyway, I wrote it in much longer form here https://www.pwnallthethings.com/p/the-war-will-end-with-diplomacy-but
The war will end with Diplomacy. But here's why it won't be soon.

Peace in this war isn't close. And premature calls for diplomacy push it further away. Instead, the West needs to provide credible public commitments to arm Ukraine, and long-term support to get peace

PwnAllTheThings
(the tl;dr is that the Russian build-up in the past few months very strongly indicate zero interest in a long-term peace agreement at anything like their current positions, and are all-in on a medium-term reconstitution and new push against Ukraine early next year; so any peace deal would be at best very temporary)
For those who think R won't accept these terms, first of all, duh, but second of all the Russian terms (according to Peskov) are still maximalist and unchanged from their late March position, except that they *also* now include permanently ceding annexed territories, including the parts of them that are not under Russian control. So both UA and R are stating terms that both understand the other can't accept (i.e. a workable peace isn't yet remotely close)
There is a danger in the US' plan to obfuscate this point; as it has the habit of encouraging hardliners in R to think UA support is weakening; encouraging UA allies to avoid long-term contingency planning; and encouraging public apathy and demoralization when the peace doesn't quickly materialize, despite it never having been seriously available.