A financial cybercrime group calling itself the Disneyland Team has been making liberal use of visually confusing phishing domains that spoof popular bank brands using Punycode, an Internet standard that allows web browsers to render domain names with non-Latin alphabets like Cyrillic and Ukrainian.

The U.S. financial services firm Ameriprise uses the domain ameriprise.com; the Disneyland Team’s domain for Ameriprise customers is https://www.xn--meripris-mx0doj[.]com [brackets added to defang the domain], which displays in the browser URL bar as ạmeriprisẹ[.]com.

Have a look at the Punycode in this Disneyland Team phishing domain: https://login2.xn--mirtesnbd-276drj[.]com, which shows up in the browser URL bar as login2.ẹmirạtesnbd[.]com, a domain targeting users of Emirates NBD Bank in Dubai.

Here’s another domain registered this year by the Disneyland Team: https://xn--clientchwb-zxd5678f[.]com, which spoofs the login page of financial advisor Charles Schwab with the landing page of cliẹntșchwab[.]com. Again, notice the dots under the letters “e” and “s”. Another Punycode domain of theirs sends would-be victims to cliẹrtschwạb[.]com, which combines a brand misspelling with Punycode.

Read more: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2022/11/disneyland-malware-team-its-a-puny-world-after-all/

The Disneyland Team aren't phishers, exactly. They use a version of the Gozi trojan to redirect victims to their fake bank page, which forwards traffic to and from the real bank site, and allows interaction with the bot/victim.
@briankrebs relay attack
@briankrebs also this is literally exactly what WebAuthn is designed for, because that can not be relayed while maintaining plaintext access. Either you proxy the entire TLS connection to the correct domain, or it fails to authenticate.
@briankrebs So this is something the BIMI email standard is meant to help with, https://bimigroup.org/ but I suspect the vast majority of people don't know this exists let alone look for it.
Home - BIMI Group

BIMI Group
@briankrebs I always planned to create a small library that would detect mixed unicode, its so simple but...time
@briankrebs
This article from 2017 had advice about how to immunize browser settings against this; eg, in Firefox about:config set “network.IDN_show_punycode” to “true”. Does this still work? Or have bad guys found workaround?
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/chrome-firefox-and-opera-users-beware-this-isnt-the-apple-com-you-want/
Chrome, Firefox, and Opera users beware: This isn’t the apple.com you want

Unicode sleight of hand makes it hard for even savvy users to detect impostor sites.

Ars Technica