@jann @spaceriker @ruud @jeroen I am pretty sure, given Mastodon’s general security position, use of cryptography standards etc, that passwords will be stored securely. You can check the source code. In theory, this could be changed by the owner of a rogue instance so there is a degree of trust involved. It is also possible to enable 2FA if you are worried.

And Twitter does not encrypt DMs either.

@jann @ruud @jeroen @spaceriker I believe for encrypted messages to help, with the admin/legal as part of the threat model, it would have to be e2e, and then you need to solve key distribution. Which is doable, but non-trivial.

Simply having the server encrypt before it stores the message means the server (and the admin) would have the key. It would help if someone managed to dump the DB, but wasn't an admin with full access.

Apologies if I'm just saying things this audience already knows ;)

@jann @ruud @jeroen @spaceriker

Mastodon uses a library called Devise for authentication: https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon/blob/main/config/initializers/devise.rb

And Devise does the right thing and hashes passwords with bcrypt: https://github.com/heartcombo/devise/blob/main/lib/devise/models/database_authenticatable.rb#L199-L206

@apinae

Yes I am the only one who has access to the database. It is true the DM is unencrypted (though your password is hashed and cant be stolen).

There is no way that anyone has figured out to encrypt it without the admin having the decryption key, and thus defeating the purpose.

We do encrypt our data at rest though so if anyone got into the sserver and had access to the raw hard drive they wouldnt be able to access it.

@ruud