Mr. Matt 
Remember folks: You must provide your password to authorities in the U.K. if told to. Failing to provide your password to authorities will get you convicted of a crime.
h3artbl33d 🐡
BenoitJ@h3artbl33d @matt exactly, I remember a feature of true crypt was a hidden encrypted partition, you get two password, one show a dummy partition, the other the real.
Exactly! It should be noted that the non-hidden part shouldn't be a brand new, default OS installation as that would raise suspicion.
Another method would be using a live environment that encrypts all temporary data, whether in RAM or on disk. Having a password vault hidden and inaccessable 'somewhere' might make this more viable.
But in the end - this is mitigating a situation that shouldn't be there in the first place. Madness!
@h3artbl33d @benoitj I would be careful with that approach. At least in regards to TrueCrypt, the authorities are well versed in hidden partitions.
True that. I think hidden partitions aren't the best means to achieve opsec. Also, one shouldn't trust a sole method. Like TOR - even if properly used, if there is a vulnerability in the browser, the user and location info could be at serious risk.
The best bet - as far as I am concerned - is to design the opsec model to the particular situation, with the assumption that everything is comprimised from the start.
@h3artbl33d @benoitj my assumption is that encryption will only thwart a casual burglar or thief. A state sponsored attacker will have means to break in (either via brute force, or drugs and a $5 wrench).