Everything is a quantum wave?

In the last post, I discussed Amanda Gefter’s critique of Vlatko Vedral’s view that observers have no special role in reality. Conveniently, Vedral published an article at IAI discussing his view: Everything in the universe is a quantum wave. (Warning: possible paywall.) Vedral puts his view forward as a radical new interpretation of quantum mechanics.

As a quick reminder, the central mystery of quantum mechanics is that quantum particles seem to act like waves, including portions of the wave interfering with itself, but when measured, behave like tiny localized balls. This is known as the measurement problem.

There are numerous interpretations of what’s happening here. But they seem to take one of three broad strategies. The first simply rejects that the waves are real, instead insisting that they are only probabilities, albeit probabilities which evolve deterministically and interfere with each other. In other words, it’s all happening in our mind. In its stronger incarnations, this has idealist or semi-idealist aspects, claiming that observation or interaction creates reality. These are the approaches in the epistemic versions of the Copenhagen Interpretation and its descendants, like QBism and RQM (relational quantum mechanics).

The second strategy is to add new structure to wave mechanics. Due to Bell’s theorem, these additions must be non-local in nature, that is, they must involve “spooky” action at a distance. The ontic version of Copenhagen takes this approach when it adds a physical collapse, as do its variations and descendants like consciousness-causing-the-collapse and other objective collapse theories. Another version of the second strategy is what are historically called “hidden variable” approaches, like Bohmian Mechanics (pilot-wave theory), where there is both a wave and a particle the entire time, with the wave guiding the particle.

The third strategy is to accept the mathematical structure of quantum theory as a full account, or one only requiring a few ancillary assumptions. This became easier with the development of decoherence theory in the 1970s, an extrapolation of quantum wave mechanics, in essence quantum entanglement en masse, that explains why quantum interference disappears at larger scales. It’s the approach Hugh Everett proposed, which eventually became known as the many-worlds interpretation.

And it’s the strategy Vedral uses for his interpretation, which he characterizes as “many-worlds on steroids.” Although he dislikes talking in terms of other worlds, noting that the classical worlds are only a small slice of the possibilities. He prefers to talk in terms of one world but with quantum mechanics being universal, applying at all scales.

Vedral makes a point I made in the last post, that under this universal quantum waves approach, an observation is just two quantum systems becoming entangled, that is, becoming correlated in certain ways. A reminder: entanglement is when two quantum systems have each of their states in superposition become correlated with each of the states in the other system. In other words, for each state in the first system, there is a correlated state in the second. The two systems are now part of the same wave function.

Vedral notes this could be characterized as the quantum particle observing the measuring device as much as the device is observing it. In this view, entanglement is what the apparent collapse looks like from the outside, and collapse is what entanglement looks like from the inside. So contra Gefter’s stance, there’s no special role for observers, at least unless by “observer” we mean everything.

As I noted in the last post, I like Vedral’s approach here of focusing on the physics rather than getting into multiverse language, which as I’ve noted before, often ends up being a distraction. But it’s hard for me to see how his view is radically different from the standard Everettian one. It’s worth noting that Everett’s original proposal was a theory of the universal wave function, essentially the “everything is a quantum wave” view Vedral is advocating. Everett didn’t talk in terms of a multiverse. It was Bryce DeWitt in the 1970s who characterized that way, although Everett saw it as just an alternate way of describing his view.

One difference from contemporary many-worlds views, which Vedral shares with Everett, is that the quantum nature of macroscopic objects is not beyond testability. Everett reportedly maintained that the quantum states of macroscopic objects were in principle detectable. I haven’t read Vedral’s book, but it sounds like a large part of it is finding ways to test his view.

This seems resonant with the progress being made in experimental research, where tiny macroscopic objects can now be held in a quantum superposition, which is putting increasing pressure on ontic collapse theories. And Vedral mentions the ongoing efforts in quantum computing, which is stress-testing quantum theory in ways scientists of earlier decades could only dream of. In the end, we need data, and these efforts are providing more of it.

As a minimalist Everettian myself, I find a lot in Vedral’s discussion compelling. But as he notes in his article, the various interpretation camps are like entrenched armies in World War I, unlikely to be moved except by the strongest experimental results. Even then, I suspect Max Planck’s observation that science moves forward “one funeral at a time” will likely be true here as it always has.

What do you think of Vedral’s views? Does the idea of everything being a quantum wave make sense? Or are there difficulties both he and I are overlooking with this approach?

#InterpretationsOfQuantumMechanics #ManyWorldInterpretation #MWI #Philosophy #PhilosophyOfScience #Physics #QuantumMechanics #Science

Avoiding the structural gaps

A long standing debate in quantum physics is whether the wave function is real. A quick reminder: quantum entities appear to move like waves, including portions interfering with each other. These waves are modeled with the wave function. But once measured, quantum objects manifest as localized points or field excitations. The wave function can’t predict the measurement outcome, only probabilities on what the result will be.

A popular move here is to decide the wave function isn’t real, that it’s just a mathematical contrivance. Doing so seems to sidestep a lot of uncomfortable implications. But it leaves us trying to explain the statistical outcomes of measurements that show patterns from portions of the wave interfering with itself. Those effects, along with entanglement, are heavily used in quantum computing. If the wave function isn’t modeling something real, then it’s usefulness in technology starts to look like a magic incantation.

Of course, accepting wave function realism leaves us with something that seems to operate in a higher dimensional “configuration space.” And we end up having to choose between unsettling options, like an objective wave function collapse on measurement, a pilot wave guiding the particle in a non-local manner, or just accepting pure wave mechanics despite its implications.

Valia Allori has an article at IAI arguing against quantum wave function realism. (Warning: you might hit a paywall.) The main thrust of her argument, as I understand it, is that we shouldn’t allow ourselves to be lured farther away from the manifest image of the world (the world as it intuitively appears to us) when there are viable alternatives.

Her argument is in opposition to Alyssa Ney’s argument for wave function realism, which touts as one of the benefits that it reclaims locality. Allori argues that this is aiming to satisfy an intuition we develop in three dimensional space, that there aren’t non-local effects, “spooky actions at a distance”. But wave function realism only preserves locality across configuration space, which Allori views as a pyrrhic victory.

Overall, Allori seems to view this as a conflict between two different sets of intuitions. On one side, we have views that are closer to the overall manifest image of reality, one with three dimensions, but at the cost of non-local phenomena. She doesn’t view this as ideal, but deems it preferable to the idea of a universal wave function existing in near infinite dimensions. In her view, embracing theories too far away from the manifest image puts us on the path that leads to runaway skepticism, where nothing we perceive can be trusted.

But I think looking at this in terms of intuitions is a mistake. When it comes to models of reality, our intuitions have historically never been particularly useful. Instead they’ve often led us astray, causing us to insist the earth was the center of the universe, humans were separate from nature, or that time and space were absolute, all ideas that had to be abandoned in the face of empirical realities. The reason to prefer locality isn’t merely to privilege one intuition over others, but to prefer theories that provide a structurally complete accounting.

A while back I described this as a preference for causally complete theories. But causation is a relation across time that is made asymmetrical by the second law of thermodynamics, that entropy always increases. The more fundamental reality are the structural relations. A theory which can account for all (or at least more of) those relations should, I think, be preferred to theories that have larger gaps in their accounting.

By that standard, I perceive wave function antirealism to have huge gaps, gaps which proponents of the idea seem comfortable with, but I suspect only because, as Allori does, they deem it a lesser evil than the alternative. Of course, objective collapse and pilot-wave theories also have gaps, but they seem smaller, albeit still weaknesses that I think should make them less viable.

Pure wave mechanics seems like the option with the fewest gaps. Many would argue that accounting for probabilities remains a crucial gap, but that seems like more of philosophical issue than a scientific one, how best to talk about what probabilities mean. In many ways, it highlights issues that already exist in the philosophy of probability.

Overall then, my take is that the goal isn’t to preserve the manifest image of reality, but to account for it in our scientific image. Preferring theories that are closer to the manifest image just because they are closer, particularly when the theories have larger gaps than the alternatives, seems to amount to what is often called “the incredulous stare”, simply rejecting an proposition because it doesn’t comport with our preexisting biases.

But maybe I’m overlooking something? Are there reasons to prefer theories closer to the manifest image? Is there a danger in excessive skepticism as Allori worries? Or is preferring a more complete accounting itself still privileging certain intuitions over others?

#InterpretationsOfQuantumMechanics #ManyWorldInterpretation #Philosophy #PhilosophyOfScience #QuantumMechanics #Science

Objective-collapse theory - Wikipedia

In this video, Matt O’Dowd tackles the issue of probabilities in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.

A quick reminder. The central mystery of quantum mechanics is that quantum particles move like waves of possible outcomes that interfere with each other, until a measurement happens, when they appear to collapse to one localized outcome, the famous wave-particle duality.

This is the measurement problem, which interpretations of quantum mechanics try to solve. One the oldest and most popular, Copenhagen, asserts that this duality is fundamental, and that further investigation is misguided. Pilot-wave posits both a particle and a wave the entire time.

Many-worlds take the structure of quantum theory as complete, that quantum physics applies to us and the environment as much as particles, resulting in a universe that is itself a wave of all possible outcomes. We only see one outcome of the measurement because we’re the version that sees that outcome, with a version of us seeing each possible outcome.

A longstanding objection to many-worlds is how to talk about probabilities. Probabilities seem reasonable in an interpretation where there’s only one outcome. But if every outcome happens, in what sense is it meaningful to talk about the probability of any one outcome? Aren’t they all 100% probable?

This objection has never bothered me, mostly because I see probabilities as relative to an observer and their limited knowledge. That’s easier to see when looking at at something like the weather forecast, where probabilities more obviously reflect our limited knowledge.

As O’Dowd explains, we can see the probabilities in many-worlds as self locating uncertainty, a view Sean Carroll champions. In the process of explaining this, O’Dowd discusses the nature of worlds in the theory, something I’ve tried to tackle before (here and here) but mostly failed at. Maybe his card stack metaphor works better for most people.

The video runs about 19 minutes.

PBS Space Time: Can The Measurement Problem Be Solved?

(Here’s a link to the video in case the embed doesn’t display.)

In the end, this is a devilishly difficult concept to explain. Which makes the video tough to follow. It might help if you have time to watch it multiple times.

It’s worth noting that there are other proposed solutions to the probability problem. But I think this one makes the most sense, although the others aren’t necessarily wrong. It comes down to your philosophy of probability. The claims of being able to derive the Born Rule in many-worlds are controversial. But at worst the theory has to simply accept the rule as a postulate, similar to the other interpretations.

What do you think? Did O’Dowd’s approach help? If not, any thoughts on where it fumbles? Or about where the explanation itself might be wrong?

https://selfawarepatterns.com/2023/12/02/many-worlds-probabilities-and-world-stacks/

#InterpretationsOfQuantumMechanics #ManyWorldInterpretation #manyWorlds #ManyWorldsInterpretation #Physics #Quantum #QuantumMechanics #Science

The nature of splitting worlds in the Everett interpretation

This post is about an aspect of the Everett many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I’ve given brief primers of the interpretation in earlier posts (see here or here), in case you ne…

SelfAwarePatterns

It’s been a while, but I’ve occasionally mentioned on the blog that Cecil B. Demille’s The Ten Commandments (the 1950s color version) is one of my favorite movies. And this has remained true even as I’ve come to see it as straight fantasy.

An interesting fact from when I first saw it as a very young boy. I initially thought Yul Brenner’s Ramses was two different characters. This was because there were several scenes with him outside in armor, and other scenes of him inside in more comfortable attire. To my five year old self, it looked like two different guys. Until the scene after Ramses’ son has just died, when he decides to go after the Israelites. Inside-Ramses calls for his armor, and in the process transforms onscreen into outside-Ramses, making me realize they were one and the same.

Over the years, I’ve encountered many other entities which initially looked like separate things, but turned out to just be the same thing seen from different perspectives or in different contexts. Time and time again, I’ve learned to be on the lookout for underlying patterns that might indicate I’m looking at different aspects of the same thing. (I think this is why I have little trouble conceptualizing consciousness as functionality.)

Which is why found this video from Matt O’Dowd interesting. He explores a proposition that David Deutsch has often expressed, that the pilot-wave interpretation of quantum mechanics is just a special case of the many-worlds interpretation.

PBS Space Time: Are Many Worlds & Pilot Wave THE SAME Theory?

O’Dowd, around the thirteen minute mark, does note one seemingly structural difference between the two, the guiding equation of pilot-wave, which tells the particle where to go. It’s not needed under many-worlds because under it, a version of the particle goes everywhere the wave function is non-zero. As he notes, many-worlds is pilot-wave minus any one version of the particle being the one true real one.

I don’t know much about the guiding equation. I do wonder if, under many-worlds, it could be seen an expression of the relationship between particles in one particular world. Or if there’s simply no room for it in that theory.

I think one reason Deutsch emphasizes the similarities between the two theories, and the one difference, is it seems to answer a common question for the idea of pure wave mechanics: waves of what? According to Deutsch, it’s waves of the different versions of the particle. This leads him to hold a particle first ontology, which seems like a minority view among Everettians (many-worlders).

Although ultimately this may just be “a six of one, half a dozen of the other” type thing. Are waves, waves of particle versions? Or are particles just fragments of waves? Under any degree of wave function realism, the answer could just be “yes”.

Unless of course I’m missing something?

https://selfawarepatterns.com/2023/09/30/are-many-worlds-and-pilot-wave-the-same-theory/

#InterpretationsOfQuantumMechanics #ManyWorldInterpretation #Physics #PilotWave #QuantumMechanics #quantumPhysics

Pharaoh's Heart was hardened - The Ten Commandments 1956

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