Is register 0x206140008 in the #iOSTriangulation PPL bypass the gfx-asc's l2c_err_sts?
https://securelist.com/operation-triangulation-the-last-hardware-mystery/111669/
When I read it, it matches the value I get for l2c_err_sts in the "GFX SError" panic log.
(Unfortunately, dma_ctrl_2 sets bit 60 in that register, which doesn't match any of the documented bits in m1n1 https://github.com/AsahiLinux/m1n1/blob/90eef7223e5da9bdc7ad7f823e7748326ba862d2/src/cpu_regs.h#L461, so no idea if it's really l2c_err_sts or not.)
@oct0xor @marcan
https://securelist.com/operation-triangulation-the-last-hardware-mystery/111669/
When I read it, it matches the value I get for l2c_err_sts in the "GFX SError" panic log.
(Unfortunately, dma_ctrl_2 sets bit 60 in that register, which doesn't match any of the documented bits in m1n1 https://github.com/AsahiLinux/m1n1/blob/90eef7223e5da9bdc7ad7f823e7748326ba862d2/src/cpu_regs.h#L461, so no idea if it's really l2c_err_sts or not.)
@oct0xor @marcan
Operation Triangulation: The last (hardware) mystery
Recent iPhone models have additional hardware-based security protection for sensitive regions of the kernel memory. We discovered that to bypass this hardware-based security protection, the attackers used another hardware feature of Apple-designed SoCs.