Building secure web apps shouldn't be a burden. We've built a high-assurance web framework at Google that makes security easy for developers. Learn about our "Secure by Design" approach and how it works in our new blog post:
cc: @ddworken
| Website 🕸️ | https://webappsec.dev |
| Google I/O 🎙️ | https://speakerdeck.com/lweichselbaum/o-19-securing-web-apps-with-modern-platform-features |
| web.dev ✍️ | https://web.dev/authors/lwe/ |
| Bluesky 🦋 | https://bsky.app/profile/webappsec.dev |
| Twitter :twitter: | https://twitter.com/we1x |
Building secure web apps shouldn't be a burden. We've built a high-assurance web framework at Google that makes security easy for developers. Learn about our "Secure by Design" approach and how it works in our new blog post:
cc: @ddworken
I put together a bluesky starter pack with amazing web security folks like @terjanq, @SheHacksPurple, @gaz and many more: http://go.bsky.app/Uf8dZhz
Please share, join, or comment if know someone who should be on that list
Very exciting! Safari TP 161* has added support for Fetch Metadata request headers! Once support lands in Safari stable, Fetch Metadata will be supported in *all* major browser engines allowing some really interesting defences: https://web.dev/fetch-metadata
*https://webkit.org/blog/13686/release-notes-for-safari-technology-preview-161/
New blog post: The death of the line of death
The "line of death" is a security boundary in web browsers about separating trustworthy browser UI from untrusted web content; I think the concept is waning in utility over time.
https://emilymstark.com/2022/12/18/death-to-the-line-of-death.html
The line of death, as Eric Lawrence explained in a classic blog post, is the idea that an application should separate trustworthy UI from untrusted content. The typical example is in a web browser, where untrustworthy web content appears below the browser toolbar UI. Trustworthy content provided by the web browser must appear either in the browser toolbar, or anchored to it or overlapping it. If this separation is maintained, then untrusted content can’t spoof the trustworthy browser UI to trick or attack the user.
Exploiting Zoom whiteboard via the clipboard. Nice find from @spaceraccoon
https://spaceraccoon.dev/analyzing-clipboardevent-listeners-stored-xss/