The Spamhaus Project

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Spamhaus strengthens trust and safety for the Internet. Advocating for change through sharing reliable intelligence and expertise. As the authority on IP and domain reputation data, we are trusted across the industry because of our strong ethics, impartiality, and quality of actionable data. This data not only protects but also provides signal and insight across networks and email worldwide. โ€ฉWith over two decades of experience, our researchers and threat hunters focus on exposing malicious activity to make the internet a better place for everyone. A wide range of industries, including leading global technology companies, use Spamhaus' data; currently protecting over 4.5 billion mailboxes worldwide.
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.bond (#6) operated by ShortDot S.A. continues to display patterns of high churn, with new domain registrations (1.13 million) almost equal to its total zone count (1.15 million) - 10โ€“20% of new domains is considered unusually high.

But this reporting period .bond is not aloneโ€ฆ

Three quarters of the Top 20 exceed this threshold ๐Ÿ˜ฑ - find out which ones in the latest Spamhaus Domain Update:

๐Ÿ‘‰ https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/domain-reputation/domain-reputation-update-oct-2025-mar-2026/

#DomainReputation #InfoSec #CyberSecurity

151.217.0.0/16 AS62016 AS198198 AS42987 AS22879 AS199524

AS62016: Virgin Media ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง
AS198198: Telefonica Global Solutions ๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ธ
AS42987: Virgin Media ๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง
AS22879: Sirus, Inc ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ
AS199524: Gcore ๐Ÿ‡ณ๐Ÿ‡ฑ
Location is Chicago.

However, this case is slightly different. 151.217.0.0/16 is a "bogon", which means the network is not assigned to anyone at this time (and so nobody should be using it).

After the first announcement, new (presumably fake) carriers were inserted into the BGP path as a decoy.

The general modus operandi suggests that this is the same gang in action.

RE: https://infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116415022836698078

Earlier this week orange
announced new routes taking precedence over its hijacked path, forcing the bad actors to withdraw the route:

90.98.0.0/15 AS41128 AS22541 AS29802 Bad actors (WITHDRAWN)
90.98.0.0/16 AS3215 AS5511 Orange ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท
90.99.0.0/16 AS3215 AS5511 Orange ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท

Meanwhile, the Verizon Business hijacks out of AS29802 remain active.

And, weโ€™ve observed an additional suspicious route โคต๏ธโคต๏ธ

Good news: over the past 30 days, activity has declined across almost all of the Top 20 countries hosting IPs associated with exploited devices.

Only four countries saw increases:

๐Ÿ‡จ๐Ÿ‡ณ #1 China (+19%)
๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ฉ #6 Indonesia (+9%)
๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ฟ #7 Algeria (+9%)
๐Ÿ‡ช๐Ÿ‡ฌ #20 Egypt (+11%)

For a full picture of where activity is rising and falling globally, dig deeper into Spamhaus Reputations Statistics here โคต๏ธโคต๏ธ
https://www.spamhaus.org/reputation-statistics/countries/exploit/

#ExploitedDevices #MaliciousIPs #ThreatIntelligence

This operation has established a clear modus operandi:

- Find a large unused network assigned to a large ISP
- Find an ASN not in use but also assigned to the same large ISP
- Set up a router announcing the network from the ASN, so that (almost) nobody will see anything wrong with the announcement.
- Set up a fake transport ISP in between, to confuse waters
- Connect the whole thing to the internet through an ISP with "relaxed" vetting procedures on what customers announce, and voila', a hijacked network is connected.

This series of events clearly demonstrates how important it is to look at routes including their connectivity, not just the ASN and network - it's only the connectivity which reveals the hijacking issue.

We've identified additional suspicious routes (see image):

AS22521 and AS4183: Verizon Business ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ
AS22541: MEGALINK S.R.L. ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ด
AS20940: Akamai International B.V.
AS18734: Operbes S.A. de C.V. ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฝ

They all lead back to Chicago. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvKs2VLmVnY โฌ‡๏ธ

RE: https://infosec.exchange/@spamhaus/116398003458245821

Over the past 48 hours there have been some very interesting developments...

The "Charter Communications" announcements for 47.1.0.0/16 and 47.2.0.0/16 have disappeared, implicitly confirming that they were hijacked.

The "Orange" announcement for AS41128 has changed - the path is now:

90.98.0.0/15 AS41128 AS22541 AS29802

AS41128: Orange ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท
AS22541: MEGALINK S.R.L. ๐Ÿ‡ง๐Ÿ‡ด
AS29802: Hivelocity ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ

The entire network has relocated from Chicago to Dallas (likely to the Prime Dallas Campus DFW01 datacenter). Once more the inclusion of a South-American ISP appears completely unrealistic, with the traffic between the AS29802 router (de-cix.dfw.hivelocity.net) and the final destination seemingly within the Dallas datacenter.

But there's more. โฌ‡๏ธ

#infosec #cyberSecurity

๐ŸŒ OUT NOW | Spamhaus Domain Report Oct 2025 - March 2026!

โฌ†๏ธ 46.9 million new domains
โฌ‡๏ธ 2.15 million malicious domain detections
โฌ†๏ธ Domains associated with botnet C&Cโ€™s (+289%) & malware (+206%)
๐Ÿ”„ .bond (and many more!) see high churn of new registrations

And find out which TLD has a massive 17.5% of its zone file listed ๐Ÿ˜ฑ!

Read the full domain report here ๐Ÿ‘‰ https://www.spamhaus.org/resource-hub/domain-reputation/domain-reputation-update-oct-2025-mar-2026/

#DomainAbuse #DomainInsights

๐Ÿ“ข FINAL REMINDER | From tomorrow we will start to restrict access to Oracle IP addresses querying our DNSBLs. To stay protected by the data, register for Spamhaus Technology's FREE Data Query Service - changes to config take minutes.

Sign up here ๐Ÿ‘‡
https://www.spamhaus.com/data-access/free-data-query-service/

#Oracle #DNSBL #DQS

Why would Orange ๐Ÿ‡ซ๐Ÿ‡ท announce 90.98.0.0/15 from Chicago ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ธ using Gcore ๐Ÿ‡ฑ๐Ÿ‡บ for intercontinental transport, while using ๐Ÿ‡ฒ๐Ÿ‡ฝ Mexican ISPs as upstreams to route traffic over what appears to be no actual distance?