This Okta vulnerability is a great demonstration that engineers should stop using cryptographic primitives as magic boxes and start looking into actual properties and parameters of the algorithm they use: https://www.theverge.com/2024/11/1/24285874/okta-52-character-login-password-authentication-bypass
Bcrypt Wikipedia article mentions the input limit of 72 bytes. Which, of course, is not a great design by modern standards, but the reason Okta turned this limitation into a vulnerability is due to misuse of a password-based key derivation function.
The name suggests that you should only feed the password to the function. Instead, Okta passed concatenation of userId + username + password.
And to make things worse, the fix that Okta chose is a step in the wrong direction: instead of fixing inputs they moved from bcrypt to PBKDF2. Which provides weaker protection of low-entropy password source than more modern functions like Argon2 (and even bcrypt itself).
It's rather disappointing to see such incompetence from a security vendor. Out of all the companies, Okta should know how to avoid mistakes when hashing passwords.
Know your cryptography. Or hire professionals.