| Musings | https://kattraxler.github.io/ |
| SANS SEC549 | https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-courses/enterprise-cloud-security-architecture/ |
| Birdsite | https://twitter.com/NightmareJS |

| Musings | https://kattraxler.github.io/ |
| SANS SEC549 | https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-courses/enterprise-cloud-security-architecture/ |
| Birdsite | https://twitter.com/NightmareJS |
✨ There is no Magic Minute ✨
Every Wednesday I break down some topic in Cloud Security.
This week is a continuation from last.
🚀 GCP User Defaults Part 2 🚀
Did you know I launched a weekly YouTube series?
Weird I know.
Every Wednesday, always under 60 seconds
I don’t post here nearly enough.
But let me catch you up, I had an absolutely epic time taking part in the inaugural fwd:CloudSec in Europe.
Making new connections across the pond that will spark so much collaboration and research!
It’s kind of embarrassing but yeah here’s my Tik tok:
https://www.tiktok.com/@thereisnomagicminute?_t=8pcgxx5i2aQ&_r=1
I’m launching a new short-form web series
🪄 There is no Magic Minute 🪄
Launching every Wednesday starting August 28th
NSA tracks Google ads to find Tor users
Link: https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
Discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41274507
It’s happening ✨
The search for transitive access abuse begins at #fwdcloudsecEU this September
🌶️🌶️🌶️
Service Agents are the ‘per-project, per-product’ machine identity in Google Cloud. When Cloud Build deploys a container or writes a container to a registry, it's the Service Agent that enables this service-to-service auth. In this talk, we'll hoist Service Agents on a lift and inspect their undercarriage, questioning why Google Cloud frequently sets their auto-assigned permissions to admin level yet positions them as inconsequential. We’ll challenge the perception that Service Agents are inherently safe, shattering the party line that their administrative power is without the potential for abuse by a malicious actor in the project. The audience will learn about transitive access techniques, revealing how Service Agents' permissions can be exploited to manipulate services and data, even without direct resource access. I will make these risks concrete by releasing a case of Service Agent abuse resulting in data exfiltration, bypassing the need for explicit Storage permissions. Using the transitivity principle, I will demonstrate how service functionality puts the end user in the driver's seat, directing a Service Agent's actions to achieve unauthorized data access. Attendees will ride to the underbelly of Google Cloud's machine identity ecosystem, where assumptions are confronted, and the security implications may reshape their understanding of Service Agents. Please keep all hands and feet inside the moving vehicle at all times.