Murray Shanahan

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I am a Professor at Imperial College London and a Research Scientist at DeepMind. Posting in a personal capacity. To send me a message please use email
I have new paper "Simulacra as Conscious Exotica" on @arxiv on #consciousness in #AI and large language models (LLMs):
arxiv.org/abs/2402.12422
I'm sending it out into the world with some trepidation; it's such a difficult and controversial issue.
My paper "Role Play with Large Language Models", co-authored with Kyle McDonell and Laria Reynolds, is out in Nature, and is free-to-read:
https://nature.com/articles/s41586-023-06647-8

It's time to rethink how we evaluate AI systems.

I'm proud to be a co-author of this new paper (led by @ryanburnell ), which has some recommendations:

https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adf6369

In the new section, I highlight several important features of LLMs which help to explain how they achieve few shot generalisation from a prompt, given that what they do at a fundamental level is “just” next token prediction.
I have revised and extended my paper, “Talking About Large Language Models”. The new version has an extra section, “How do LLMs Generalise?”:
https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.03551
Talking About Large Language Models

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

arXiv.org

We know from the long history of “classical” AI techniques tha ends-means reasoning (backward chaining) can be highly effective and more efficient than forward-reasoning.

This paper achieves significant gains on logic reasoning by inducing an LM to chain backwards from conclusion to premise: https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.13894

The LM is “wrapped” by a larger, ire traditional algorithm. This is notable because it acknowledges that LMs can be made more powerful with external routines.

1/3

LAMBADA: Backward Chaining for Automated Reasoning in Natural Language

Remarkable progress has been made on automated reasoning with natural text, by using Language Models (LMs) and methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Selection-Inference. These techniques search for proofs in the forward direction from axioms to the conclusion, which suffers from a combinatorial explosion of the search space, and thus high failure rates for problems requiring longer chains of reasoning. The classical automated reasoning literature has shown that reasoning in the backward direction (i.e. from the intended conclusion to supporting axioms) is significantly more efficient at proof-finding. Importing this intuition into the LM setting, we develop a Backward Chaining algorithm, called LAMBADA, that decomposes reasoning into four sub-modules. These sub-modules are simply implemented by few-shot prompted LM inference. We show that LAMBADA achieves sizable accuracy boosts over state-of-the-art forward reasoning methods on challenging logical reasoning datasets, particularly when deep and accurate proof chains are required.

arXiv.org
The paper is not making any claims about what systems based on LLMs might one day be capable of. The paper is neutral about this. 4/4
The paper is not trying to ban words like “believes”, “knows”, or “thinks” in the context of LLMs. Rather, the paper is advocating caution, so people don’t take such words literally when they are meant only figuratively. 3/4
The paper is not making philosophical claims about belief, knowledge, or thought. Rather, the paper draws attention to the difference between humans, to whom such concepts naturally apply, and today’s LLM-based systems, where things get complicated. 2/4
It’s nice to see that my paper on large language models is getting attention . But some readers might be taking me to be saying things I'm not. So here’s a short clarificatory thread. https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.03551 1/4
Talking About Large Language Models

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

arXiv.org