Mona Paulsen

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Assistant Professor in International Economic Law, LSE Law School; research/teach trade law, investment law, development, economic security. @loyaladvisor on the Bird.
websitehttps://www.lse.ac.uk/law/people/academic-staff/mona-paulsen
Frequently, I hear about the WTO as outdated making it impossible for governments to tackle big topics, like recent developments in so-called overcapacity. But, I think there's considerable scope in the rules to bring cases and have discussions in committee. Check out why here: https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2024/04/overcapacity-and-future-discussions-in-the-scm-committee.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

๐Ÿ‘‡๐Ÿป even setting this question in historical context against the minds of the NIEO architects designing a new global project in the swamps of the double standard of debt in the 70s.

RT @[email protected]

Mo Ibrahim nails what is perhaps THE question for economic development, the energy transition and prosperity in the @[email protected]

๐Ÿฆ๐Ÿ”—: https://twitter.com/David_McNair/status/1620380441332297728

david_mcnair on Twitter

โ€œMo Ibrahim nails what is perhaps THE question for economic development, the energy transition and prosperity in the @FTโ€

Twitter

I have received several notifications of panels dominated by Western male speakers dealing with one or a combination of WTO trade security, globalisation, sanctions, export controls, or the US economic security legislation.

Do better convenors. No, I will not plug your panel.

Finally, the real lesson is that members who want to maintain multilateral rules need to do more - create incentives/disincentives in the real world where the US wants greater autonomy. Lawyers can help write those plans. Creating norms to undergird those plans will be tougher.
With this introduction in mind, I present Post 2: https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2023/01/the-curious-case-of-us-self-judging-part-2.html. It's deep dive and not intended to prove violation claims are the best route (NO!) but how the US could have done better. And our takeaway is to focus on due process, transparency, and early communication.
Nevertheless, let's not overshadow how the United States lost its security defence in these cases. The goal is not simply curbing US protectionism but -and maybe the US forgot this - formal and informal rules operate to check all governments from escalating disputes.
Last week, the US appealed the US-Steel and Aluminium Products panel report arguing that no international body can judge its security claims. Well, the US consents to WTO rules pursuant to its constitutional processes. Or are we asking the wrong questions?
This is not to slam the US. I am the first to support proposals to better manage how we resolve questions of controls with the benefits of trade, regardless of the governments' subjective motivations. This can be done, eg, through deliberation on norms, procedures, & peer review.
Did the panel judge US security claims or did the panel try to assess whether that claim fit within what WTO Members agreed were the legitimate 'circumstances'? I'd argue the latter. Further, the panel went out of its way to accept what the US concluded were necessary actions.

RT @[email protected]

@[email protected] has a post @[email protected] on a comment from USTR Tai on adjudicating national security measures @[email protected]. I have a longer response to all the December panel reports forthcoming, but for now let me tackle one claim - the "democracy deficit" (EU debates literature). Short ๐Ÿงต

๐Ÿฆ๐Ÿ”—: https://twitter.com/loyaladvisor/status/1610197753216344064

Mona Paulsen on Twitter

โ€œ@snlester has a post @WorldTradeLaw on a comment from USTR Tai on adjudicating national security measures @WTO. I have a longer response to all the December panel reports forthcoming, but for now let me tackle one claim - the "democracy deficit" (EU debates literature). Short ๐Ÿงตโ€

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