Associate Professor @ NYU Tandon. Security, RE, ML. PGP http://keybase.io/moyix/
On leave from NYU, building offsec agents at xbow.com
Founder of the MESS Lab: http://messlab.moyix.net
| Homepage | https://moyix.net/ |
| Erdős-Bacon Number | 3+3=6 |
Associate Professor @ NYU Tandon. Security, RE, ML. PGP http://keybase.io/moyix/
On leave from NYU, building offsec agents at xbow.com
Founder of the MESS Lab: http://messlab.moyix.net
| Homepage | https://moyix.net/ |
| Erdős-Bacon Number | 3+3=6 |
The problem of reversing the compilation process, decompilation, is an important tool in reverse engineering of computer software. Recently, researchers have proposed using techniques from neural machine translation to automate the process in decompilation. Although such techniques hold the promise of targeting a wider range of source and assembly languages, to date they have primarily targeted C code. In this paper we argue that existing neural decompilers have achieved higher accuracy at the cost of requiring language-specific domain knowledge such as tokenizers and parsers to build an abstract syntax tree (AST) for the source language, which increases the overhead of supporting new languages. We explore a different tradeoff that, to the extent possible, treats the assembly and source languages as plain text, and show that this allows us to build a decompiler that is easily retargetable to new languages. We evaluate our prototype decompiler, Beyond The C (BTC), on Go, Fortran, OCaml, and C, and examine the impact of parameters such as tokenization and training data selection on the quality of decompilation, finding that it achieves comparable decompilation results to prior work in neural decompilation with significantly less domain knowledge. We will release our training data, trained decompilation models, and code to help encourage future research into language-agnostic decompilation.
As we shift our focus from benchmarks to real world applications, we will be sharing some of the most interesting vulnerabilities XBOW has found in real-world, open-source targets. The first of these is an authentication bypass in Scoold, a popular open-source Q&A platform.
Five professional pentesters were asked to find and exploit the vulnerabilities in 104 realistic web security benchmarks. The most senior of them, with over twenty years of experience, solved 85% during 40 hours, while others scored 59% or less. XBOW also scored 85%, doing so in 28 minutes. This illustrates how XBOW can boost offensive security teams, freeing them to focus on the most interesting and challenging parts of their job.