David Benjamin

68 Followers
49 Following
27 Posts
There are lots of people with my name. I'm the Chromium (and cuttlefish) one. I work on TLS, cryptography, and general amusements in Chrome and BoringSSL.
Websitehttps://davidben.net
Quantum frontiers may be closer than they appear

An overview of how Google is accelerating its timeline for post-quantum cryptography migration.

Google
@jdeblasio and I wrote up a post-quantum HTTPS authentication roadmap. Perhaps it'll be of interest to some folks here:
https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/post-quantum-auth-roadmap/
Post-Quantum HTTPS Authentication Roadmap

@filippo @icing I should say, it really is important to me that this work for things like curl. There's more stuff we need to fill into the spec right now, but we'll have a really hard time moving to this if you can't *at least* slot the basic standalone cert + only checking for CA signature behavior into all the Web-adjacent places today.

(I also hope we can broader transparency enforcement than today and the broad deployment of the optimization, but as you say, I'm sure not every install will be able to do everything.)

@filippo @icing +1! Feel free to send any thoughts you have here, to us directly, on the GitHub, PLANTS list, or whenever you find most comfortable. (I hope we can keep PLANTS chill, at least by IETF standards, but I know those can sometimes be daunting.)

@icing @filippo Indeed. Like I said, this design does not need the blob to function. We did think of this. 🙂 The standalone certificates work, as the name says, standalone. They are comparable in size to what you'd have gotten if we hadn't done anything at all.

It would be great if upki lets many curl installs get the optimization. But if some curl installs cannot (just as some Chrome installs cannot), it is still fine.

@filippo @icing Likewise for MTCs. The blob can even be authenticated on the receiving client if you send down the signatures and consistency proofs, though that does make the blob a bit bigger.

@icing @filippo No, that's still not right. The optimization does not rely on per-site state. It relies on site-independent information that you get from your update service, just like CRLsets/CRLite/upki. (Indeed we've been the one trying to hold the line at that *because* it's a better privacy story.)

And if you don't get that update, for whatever reason, the standalone certificates work just fine. Servers are expected to have both. (Even in browsers, we cannot assume 100% of all clients are up-to-date with component updates.)

New blog post: ML-KEM Mythbusting.

Due to reasons.

https://keymaterial.net/2025/11/27/ml-kem-mythbusting/

ML-KEM Mythbusting

What is this? There have been some recent concerns about ML-KEM, NIST’s standard for encryption with Post-Quantum Cryptography, related standards of the IETF, and lots of conspiracy theories …

Key Material
5pm IETF BoFs with chatrooms full of plant discussions are the best IETF BoFs
The MOARTLS journey continues! Looking forward to next year https://security.googleblog.com/2025/10/https-by-default.html
HTTPS by default

One year from now, with the release of Chrome 154 in October 2026, we will change the default settings of Chrome to enable “Always Use Secu...

Google Online Security Blog