RIP Tony Hoare. His obituaries are talking about quicksort, but I think his most notable accomplishments are Communicating Sequential Processes, the Occam programming language, and the Transputer, an early example of a parallel processor
https://blog.computationalcomplexity.org/2026/03/tony-hoare-1934-2026.html?m=1
🌐 The security community has moved 🔐protocols over the last decade from RSA to elliptic curves, allowing for smaller key sizes
⚛️ While #quantum algorithms research focused around optimizing Shor’s (breaking RSA), a new result shows that breaking the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem requires significantly less qubits than previously thought.
⚠️ Breaking P-256, which has equivalent classical security to RSA-3072, only requires 1193 logical qubits against 2043.
Solving the Discrete Logarithm problem on the group of points of an elliptic curve is one of the major cryptographic applications of Shor's algorithm. However, current estimates for the number of qubits required remain relatively high, and notably, higher than the best recent estimates for factoring of RSA moduli. For example, recent work by Gidney (arXiv 2025) estimates 2043 logical qubits for breaking 3072-bit RSA, while previous work by Häner et al. (PQCrypto 2020) estimates a requirement of 2124 logical qubits for solving discrete logarithm instances on 256-bit elliptic curves over prime fields. Indeed, for an $n$-bit elliptic curve, the most space-optimized optimized implementation by Proos and Zalka (Quant. Inf. Comput. 2003) gives $5n + o(n)$ qubits, as more additional space is required to store the coordinates of points and compute the addition law. In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to the computation of point multiplication in Shor's algorithm (on input $k$, computing $k P$ where $P$ is a fixed point). Instead of computing the point multiplication explicitly, we use a Residue Number System to compute directly the projective coordinates of $k P$ with low space usage. Then, to avoid performing any modular inversion, we compress the result to a single bit using a Legendre symbol. This strategy allows us to obtain the most space-efficient polynomial-time algorithm for the ECDLP to date, with only $3.12n + o(n)$ qubits, at the expense of an increase in gate count, from $\mathcal{O}(n^3)$ to $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^3)$. For $n = 256$ we estimate that 1098 qubits would be necessary, with 22 independent runs, using $2^{38.10}$ Toffoli gates each. This represents a much higher gate count than the previous estimate by Häner et al. (roughly $2^{30}$), but half of the corresponding number of qubits (2124).
AI Found Twelve New Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
The title of the post is”What AI Security Research Looks Like When It Works,” and I agree:
In the latest
If you use AI-generated code, you currently cannot claim copyright on it in the US. If you fail to disclose/disclaim exactly which parts were not written by a human, you forfeit your copyright claim on *the entire codebase*.
This means copyright notices and even licenses folks are putting on their vibe-coded GitHub repos are unenforceable. The AI-generated code, and possibly the whole project, becomes public domain.
Source: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB10922/LSB10922.8.pdf
Tony “Abolish ICE” Arcieri🌹🦀
lcamtuf 
MeidasTouch
Robin DeRosa
cosmo
Dirk Schrödter
Frédéric Jacobs
Die Reklame
Schneier on Security RSS
Jamie Gaskins