Why PHP is Still Alive? Or Why Node Can't Kill It.
https://lemmy.world/post/29848678

Why PHP is Still Alive? Or Why Node Can't Kill It. - Lemmy.World
You may hate me for this, but this is what’s really going on. I love JS/TS and
Node but the world is built in economies of scale not in love for programming
languages… and PHP is the best when it comes to cheap scaling. Really hope
someone at Node decides to make it fast-cgi compatible in a nice way.
Why PHP is Still Alive? Or Why Node Can't Kill It.
https://lemmy.world/post/29848623

Why PHP is Still Alive? Or Why Node Can't Kill It. - Lemmy.World
You may hate me for this, but this is what’s really going on. I love JS/TS and
Node but the world is built in economies of scale not in love for programming
languages… and PHP is the best when it comes to cheap scaling. Really hope
someone at Node decides to make it fast-cgi compatible in a nice way.
🛡️ uSentry - Identity & Access Management
https://lemmy.world/post/28699008

🛡️ uSentry - Identity & Access Management - Lemmy.World
cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/28692919
[https://lemmy.world/post/28692919] > uSentry is a lightweight, self-hosted
Identity and Access Management (IAM) and Single Sign-On (SSO) solution designed
for homelab and small-scale environments. > > ⚡ A single PHP file. < 400 lines
of code. No database. No background processes. No cloud. Just works. ⚡ > > Most
IAM and SSO solutions require databases, certificates and background services
baked into a dozen containers. This is all fine but also also overkill for
homelabs and impossible for low-power ARM devices. uSentry is different, it
isn’t pretty but it sucks less for a lot of use cases. > > Enjoy!
🛡️ uSentry - Identity & Access Management
https://lemmy.world/post/28692919

🛡️ uSentry - Identity & Access Management - Lemmy.World
uSentry is a lightweight, self-hosted Identity and Access Management (IAM) and
Single Sign-On (SSO) solution designed for homelab and small-scale environments.
⚡ A single PHP file. < 400 lines of code. No database. No background processes.
No cloud. Just works. ⚡ Most IAM and SSO solutions require databases,
certificates and background services baked into a dozen containers. This is all
fine but also also overkill for homelabs and impossible for low-power ARM
devices. uSentry is different, it isn’t pretty but it sucks less for a lot of
use cases. Enjoy!
Paranoia Level: Virtualization vs Isolated Machines for Self-Hosting?
https://lemmy.world/post/23099301
Paranoia Level: Virtualization vs Isolated Machines for Self-Hosting? - Lemmy.World
cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/23071801
[https://lemmy.world/post/23071801] > Considering a lot of people here are
self-hosting both private stuff, like a NAS and also some other is public like
websites and whatnot, how do you approach segmentation in the context of virtual
machines versus dedicated machines? > > This is generally how I see the
community action on this: > > ## Scenario 1: Fully Isolated Machine for Public
Stuff > Two servers one for the internal stuff (NAS) and another for the public
stuff totally isolated from your LAN (websites, email etc). Preferably with a
public IP that is not the same as your LAN and the traffic to that machines
doesn’t go through your main router. Eg. a switch between the ISP ONT and your
router that also has a cable connected for the isolated machine. This way the
machine is completely isolated from your network and not dependent on it. > > ##
Scenario 2: Single server with VM exposed > A single server hosting two VMs, one
to host a NAS along with a few internal services running in containers, and
another to host publicly exposed websites. Each website could have its own
container inside the VM for added isolation, with a reverse proxy container
managing traffic. > > For networking, I typically see two main options: > > -
Option A: Completely isolate the “public-facing” VM from the internal network by
using a dedicated NIC in passthrough mode for the VM; > - Option B: Use a switch
to deliver two VLANs to the host—one for the internal network and one for public
internet access. In this scenario, the host would have two VLAN-tagged
interfaces (e.g., eth0.X) and bridge one of them with the “public” VM’s network
interface. Here’s a diagram for reference: https://ibb.co/PTkQVBF
[https://ibb.co/PTkQVBF] > > In the second option, a firewall would run inside
the “public” VM to drop all inbound except for http traffic. The host would
simply act as a bridge and would not participate in the network in any way. > >
## Scenario 3: Exposed VM on a Windows/Linux Desktop Host > Windows/Linux
desktop machine that runs KVM/VirtualBox/VMware to host a VM that is directly
exposed to the internet with its own public IP assigned by the ISP. In this
setup, a dedicated NIC would be passed through to the VM for isolation. > > The
host OS would be used as a personal desktop and contain sensitive information. >
> ## Scenario 4: Dual-Boot Between Desktop and Server > A dual-boot setup where
the user switches between a OS for daily usage and another for hosting stuff
when needed (with a public IP assigned by the ISP). The machine would have a
single Ethernet interface and the user would manually switch network cables
between: a) the router (NAT/internal network) when running the “personal” OS and
b) a direct connection to the switch (and ISP) when running the “public/hosting”
OS. > > For increased security, each OS would be installed on a separate NVMe
drive, and the “personal” one would use TPM with full disk encryption to protect
sensitive data. If the “public/hosting” system were compromised. > > The theory
here is that, if properly done, the TPM doesn’t release the keys to decrypt the
“personal” disk OS when the user is booted into the “public/hosting” OS. > >
People also seem to combine both scenarios with Cloudflare tunnels or reverse
proxies on cheap VPS. > > ------- > > What’s your approach / paranoia level :D >
> Do you think using separate physical machines is really the only sensible way
to go? How likely do you think VM escape attacks and VLAN hopping or other
networking-based attacks are? > > Let’s discuss how secure these setups are,
what pitfalls one should watch out for on each one, and what considerations need
to be addressed.
Paranoia Level: Virtualization or Isolated Machines for Self-Hosting?
https://lemmy.world/post/23071801
Paranoia Level: Virtualization or Isolated Machines for Self-Hosting? - Lemmy.World
Considering a lot of people here are self-hosting both private stuff, like a NAS
and also some other is public like websites and whatnot, how do you approach
segmentation in the context of virtual machines versus dedicated machines? This
is generally how I see the community action on this: Scenario 1: Fully Isolated
Machine for Public Stuff Two servers one for the internal stuff (NAS) and
another for the public stuff totally isolated from your LAN (websites, email
etc). Preferably with a public IP that is not the same as your LAN and the
traffic to that machines doesn’t go through your main router. Eg. a switch
between the ISP ONT and your router that also has a cable connected for the
isolated machine. This way the machine is completely isolated from your network
and not dependent on it. Scenario 2: Single server with VM exposed A single
server hosting two VMs, one to host a NAS along with a few internal services
running in containers, and another to host publicly exposed websites. Each
website could have its own container inside the VM for added isolation, with a
reverse proxy container managing traffic. For networking, I typically see two
main options: - Option A: Completely isolate the “public-facing” VM from the
internal network by using a dedicated NIC in passthrough mode for the VM; -
Option B: Use a switch to deliver two VLANs to the host—one for the internal
network and one for public internet access. In this scenario, the host would
have two VLAN-tagged interfaces (e.g., eth0.X) and bridge one of them with the
“public” VM’s network interface. Here’s a diagram for reference:
https://ibb.co/PTkQVBF [https://ibb.co/PTkQVBF] In the second option, a firewall
would run inside the “public” VM to drop all inbound except for http traffic.
The host would simply act as a bridge and would not participate in the network
in any way. People also seem to combine both scenarios with Cloudflare tunnels
or reverse proxies on cheap VPS. ------- What’s your approach / paranoia level
:D Do you think using separate physical machines is really the only sensible way
to go? How likely do you think VM escape attacks and VLAN hopping or other
networking-based attacks are? Let’s discuss how secure these setups are, what
pitfalls one should watch out for on each one, and what considerations need to
be addressed.
Sonic Adventure Cover - High Resolution Image
https://lemmy.world/post/21563401
Sonic Adventure Cover - High Resolution Image - Lemmy.World
cross-posted from: https://lemmy.world/post/21563379
[https://lemmy.world/post/21563379] > Hello, > > I’m looking for a high
resolution image of the PAL cover from the Dreamcast (I believe). > > There was
this website covergalaxy that used it have in 2382x2382 but all the content
seems to be gone. Here’s the cache https://ibb.co/nRMhjgw
[https://ibb.co/nRMhjgw] . Internet archive doesn’t have it. > > Much
appreciated! >
Sonic Adventure Cover - High Resolution Image
https://lemmy.world/post/21563379
Sonic Adventure Cover - High Resolution Image - Lemmy.World
Hello, I’m looking for a high resolution image of the PAL cover from the
Dreamcast (I believe). There was this website covergalaxy that used it have in
2382x2382 but all the content seems to be gone. Here’s the cache
https://ibb.co/nRMhjgw [https://ibb.co/nRMhjgw] . Internet archive doesn’t have
it. Much appreciated!

So you want privacy? - Lemmy.World
The most severe restrictions to the general public are imposed within a 20-mile
(32 km) radius of the Green Bank Observatory.[5] The Observatory polices the
area actively for devices emitting excessive electromagnetic radiation such as
microwave ovens, Wi-Fi access points and faulty electrical equipment and request
citizens discontinue their usage. It does not have enforcement power[6]
(although the FCC can impose a fine of $50 on violators[7]), but will work with
residents to find solutions.
ESP32 - Clock gotchas and how to fix them
https://lemmy.world/post/18152240
ESP32 - RTC / Clock gotchas and how to fix them - Lemmy.World