

Therefore, computational functionalism fails and one of the following holds: biological naturalism, a nonbiological yet noncomputational version of functionalism, or a view according to which consciousness requires specific (macro)physical qualities.
For now I've just posted it on Academia.edu. If you want to see it but lack access, let me know.
My commentary on Anil Seth's forthcoming BBS target article defending biological naturalism has been accepted. It's entitled "The Neurobiophysical Substrate of Consciousness":
Abstract: I argue that creature consciousness depends on specific neurobiophysical properties that constitute the medium for phenomenally conscious states. Such properties are not medium flexible in the way required by computational functionalism. ...
I recently learned that Robert "Bob" Gordon, of simulation theory fame, passed away on April 13, 2025, at the age of 92. A celebration of his life will occur on Sunday, September 28, 2025 at 5:00 โ 7:00 pm Central at the Ethical Society of St. Louis.
Bob continued to publish in philosophy into his 80s. Everything I read by him is insightful, original, and worth reading and thinking about.
I learned a lot from Bob. I will always remember his warmth, kindness, and insight.
A substantively revised version of the SEP entry on Computation in Physical Systems, with several updates, new references, and other improvements, just came live.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computation-physicalsystems/
Gill Eapen interviewed me on some of my recent work -- integrating psych and neuro, classical vs nonclassical LOT, egalitarian composition and realization, and knowing that as knowing how -- for the podcast Scientific Sense. Links in the comments.
Audio: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/prof-gualtiero-piccinini-professor-of-philosophy-at/id1515026470?i=1000714817027
Video: https://youtu.be/eqebmqkVK5M