At this week Troopers Conference, ERNW hosted Telco Sec Day (TSD) again, a small invite-only satellite event under Chatham House rules. This year's agenda had quite a number of very interesting talks and provided a great foundation for fruitful discussions.
- Tomasz Lisowski & Marius Muench: A SIM Hacking Odyssey: Can a SIM hack YOU?
- Sébastien Dudek: Hacking 5G: From Radio Security to the APIs
- El Mehdi Regragui: Top 5G Security Vulnerabilities: Insights from P1 Security Pentest Activities
Mounted my first Luksbox, protected by a Yubikey. Works very well.
Compared to Gocryptfs: you have support for FIDO2 keys.
Compared to veracrypt and truecrypt, the big advantage is you don't have to reserve x Gb for the encrypted partition.
#luks #encrypted #partition #volume #fido #crypt #file #linux
cc: @Penthertz
🔐 Releasing LUKSbox: encrypted vaults that survive the next decade.
Drop sensitive files on any cloud or USB. The provider gets one random-looking blob they can't read, even under subpoena.
✅ FIDO2 (YubiKey, Titan, Nitrokey, Windows Hello)
✅ TPM 2.0 keyslots
✅ Post-quantum hybrid (ML-KEM-768/1024 - FIPS 203)
✅ Detached header → zero metadata on the container
✅ Linux / macOS / Windows
✅ Rust, Apache-2.0, 30M+ fuzz iterations
v0.1.0 is out. External audit next.
👉 https://github.com/PentHertz/LUKSbox
#infosec #encryption #postquantum #FIDO2 #rust #opensource #cryptography #penthertz
This morning I came across another interesting paper submitted at the NDSS Symposium 2026 like the BLERP paper already documented in this forum, but this time challenging the Wi-Fi client isolation that gives us the impression of security. But guess what? Client isolation is not a properly standardized feature of the IEEE 802.11 standards… So “does client isolation protect clients from attacking each other on Wi-Fi networks as intended, across different implementations?” - this is the question ...
People are a little afraid Arduino would be a dead end project since it was purchased by Qualcomm it seems (your code belongs to them, no reverse engineering allowed, data collection, etc.). So basically they would probably be bitten by ESP if it is not already the case. But if you’d like to simulate some Arduino projects, or just simple LEDs blinking before Xmass, I just discovered a new project thanks to @nono2357 post on X which allows you to simulate an Arduino project without the hardware…...
Introduction Last week Daniele Antonioli posted an interesting paper and tooling (two nRF52840 boards, custom NimBLE btshell + Scapy-based Python Host for the double-channel MitM), he did with Tommaso Sacchetti on BLE Re-pairing attacks which probably deserves more attention than it got. This work was presented after 1.5 year of research at Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2026, and could actually answer some people’s questions → How secure is the re-pairing process i...
Interesting blog post following the problem found on BitLocker but this time on a Linux device using the TPM: [CVE-2026-0714] TPM-sniffing LUKS Keys on an Embedded Device Here is a good example, that like Windows systems (link 1, link2, link3), Linux devices using TPM can also be vulnerable to TPM sniffing attacks through SPI (No way!): (source: [CVE-2026-0714] TPM-sniffing LUKS Keys on an Embedded Device ) Compared to Windows BitLocker that uses command 0x00000158 for TPM2_Unseal,LUKS on ...
Something to try on: https://pcbtracer.com/ It is possible to draw the pins, power, components other a high quality picture, but there is also an AI function that could be interesting to find components automatically. Here is a nice YT channel to learning using this tool: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fBzjK3RsrAw&list=PL9pyFBJOY-8z-iKa6T6HZMkzY2j7JyZj3&index=1 I’m putting that aside for this week 🙂 If someone has some feedback, let us now here!
POV: you demo a vulnerability on stage in 2019, release a full exploitation tool (V2GInjector), present it at conferences and then get silent for some years...
...and in 2025 it finally gets a CVE because someone else reported it to CISA 💀
At least they credited us. Thanks CISA 🤝
CVE-2025-12357 — SLAC MitM on ISO 15118-2 EV charging. CVSS 8.3.
AKA "the HPGP standard is broken by design, we told you so."
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-12357
Peter
cryptax