Amusing title that is probably true (LLMs don't have consciousness, Hinton is not a consciousness expert), although I think their argument may merely be about Turing equivalence:

"If LLMs Have Human-Like Attributes, Then So Does Age of Empires II"
https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.31514

A comment on lobsters says that AoE also has a built-in AI in the form of a CLIPS S-EXPR expert system (which is Good Old Fashioned AI).
https://lobste.rs/s/owclks

If LLMs Have Human-Like Attributes, Then So Does Age of Empires II

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain constant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions, regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that \textit{Age of Empires II} is functionally- and Turing-complete.

arXiv.org

@dougmerritt

Discussion about consciousness in a nutshell:

"Let me tell you about what consciousness is, obviously."

Only analytical philosophers seem to have some interest in different definitions and finding out what others think.

@maxpool
Exactly!!!

It's not well-defined in the first place, so people who take firm positions without even bothering to spell out what they mean are being stupid, no matter how smart they are otherwise.

(And the ones who *do* define what they mean are doing somewhat better, but what they offer is typically very easy to critique.)

I find it rather irritating.

@dougmerritt @maxpool rocks are superintelligent, right? It is hard to imagine how wet objects are similarly intelligent at all, how would it even work. This was an attempted Terry Pratchett reference.

@dougmerritt @maxpool
Small clarification from the abstract, they trained a gameplaying deep learning system to play the strategy game, and the strategy game has a gof_ai expert system in it.

Then the argument is that the behaviours of their gameplaying DL is experiencing gamer emotions in the same way and to the same extent that megacorporate chatbots are experiencing 1900 number emotions.

@screwlisp @maxpool
Someone said that the abstract incorrectly said "on" the game when they meant "in" the game. I didn't bother to check which one was correct, but it appears that your comment's premise hinges on this -- although I again agree with your conclusion.
@dougmerritt
I will check the paper eventually, some bits of the abstract were odd so I may have misread it. E.g. why did they prove that /age of empires/ itself was turing complete? Normally the observation is that /deep learning/ is turing complete i i r c not at the front of my brain.
@maxpool

@screwlisp
Since I haven't ranted about this for a long time: human brains and minds are not Turing Complete nor equivalent, trivially, since humans are wrong like *ALL THE TIME*.

Turing machines are not. QED.
@maxpool

@dougmerritt @screwlisp

In theoretical computer science, Turing completeness is a property of a system's architecture (instruction set, or rules) not what it does or it's physical execution, or external limits.

If we count our "fixed tape" as part of our internal architecture, we are just finite state machines.

And in no case can any physical execution of a machine with limited running time (input dependent or not) do more than sufficiently large finite state machine.

@maxpool
None of that contradicts my point.

If a Turing machine runs a tape that emulates humans that say that false things are true, then the simulation running on that Turing machine is no longer Turing complete; you need to change its program back to something where true != false.

It doesn't matter that the underlying Turing machine is Turing complete. We're concerned with the overall system's behavior.

Turing machines could be modified to allow them to calculate incorrect results, which would in one sense evade various theoretical limits, but generally getting false results is not what we want.

Humans minds being fallible yet still of interest is, overall, not well understood at all.

@screwlisp

@dougmerritt @screwlisp

This seems like category error.

Turing machine not being allowed to give incorrect results makes machine either strictly less or more powerful than Turing machine.

1. sub-Turing: total programming language.

2. super-Turing ability to detect if the program is correct and not give wrong answers.

The computer in front of you is Turing equivalent RA-machine. It can execute buggy programs and randomly generated binaries as you know.

@maxpool
> either strictly less or more powerful than Turing machine.

Not so. Add a randomizer that forces a Turing machine, that contains an answer symbol to emit, to stop after a random amount of time, rather than using stopping/nonstopping as the result. It will now compute anything at, just incorrectly in some (many) cases.

That makes it super-Turing when it is right and sub-Turing when it is wrong.

You could even just use the randomizer to get the answer, with the same conclusion, but since there's no Turing machine, that feels less satisfying. :)

(This is not the way oracles are usually used, of course.)

@screwlisp @vnikolov

@dougmerritt @maxpool @screwlisp @vnikolov

No, it's always less than Turing complete, even when it's right.

@simon_brooke
Because of the "complete", yes, alright.

I'm having so much trouble expressing myself without gross errors in addition to opacity that I'd better just rethink this.

Thanks for the feedback.

@maxpool @screwlisp @vnikolov

@maxpool
> The computer in front of you is Turing equivalent RA-machine. It can execute buggy programs and randomly generated binaries as you know.

True, and I think I've been unclear.

Ultimately I'm saying that it's important to distinguish Turing machines from the programs they run.

The latter cannot be more powerful than the Turing machine itself, but they can be (and usually are) *less* powerful.

@screwlisp
@vnikolov

@dougmerritt @screwlisp @vnikolov

If the program can simulate Turing machine, it is Turing equivalent.

Humans can simulate Turing machine, not very far but still. With paper and pen, as long as needed. We have the architecture to do so.

@maxpool
Yes, of course you're right. My point is about programs that do *not* simulate Turing machines.

A human *can* simulate a Turing machine, but usually they do not.

When they are not doing so, they are (at least potentially) not Turing equivalent.

@screwlisp @vnikolov

«Humans can simulate Turing machine, not very far but still. With paper and pen, as long as needed. We have the architecture to do so.»

I don't really know if that is "sufficiently true".
Long before we hit the limit of mortality, we hit the limit of mistakes during boring and repetitive tasks.
I don't think we can abstract this away.
I suppose we can safely say that humans can simulate small Turing machines for a short time.
I don't know if that is enough.

In any case a substantial analysis would require a substantial definition of "can simulate".

@maxpool @dougmerritt @screwlisp

«... distinguish Turing machines from the programs they run.

The latter cannot be more powerful than the Turing machine itself, but they can be (and usually are) *less* powerful.»

Cannot be more powerful in a theory-of-algorithms sense, yes, certainly, but the interesting question (with a difficult answer) is whether they can simulate adequately something that may not be a Turing machine.
Where "adequately" and "may not be" need to be specified precisely and that is by itself difficult (or at least time-consuming).

@dougmerritt @maxpool @screwlisp

@maxpool wrote:
«If we count our "fixed tape" as part of our internal architecture, we are just finite state machines.»

If the human mind only processes symbols.
(I forget the official term for this hypothesis.)
If there is a continuous ingredient... who knows...

@dougmerritt @screwlisp

@vnikolov @dougmerritt @screwlisp

If you have infinite precision (true reals), you get a BSS machine or a real RAM machine, and they are super-Turing. I think a true analog recurrent neural network is equivalent.

In practice, thermal noise and quantum noise should make this point moot. You can simulate a realistic analog system with a probabilistic Turing machine. Just simulate finite-precision reals and add noise from a second tape.

Penrose had a theory, there are others.

---

There are plenty of neuroscience books and articles saying brain is not a computer, and often they don't make it clear if they mean "digital computer as a model for brain research" (who argues against them) or "computability theory" sense (very strong and controversial claim).

Yes to all.

Just one extra thing, though very raw:

«You can simulate a realistic analog system with a probabilistic Turing machine. Just simulate finite-precision reals and add noise from a second tape.»

I wonder if this fully covers chaos-theoretical systems (or whatever they are called).

@maxpool @dougmerritt @screwlisp

@vnikolov
Depends on what you mean. Chaos of course is not just dependent on initial conditions, but also on the precision -- in the general case, in theory the precision needs to be infinite (e.g. for infinite zoom on the Mandelbrot or Julia sets).

In practice we have some finite limit on precision and we must be content with lower zoom in those cases, and with unknown final states in other cases.

@maxpool @screwlisp

I mean that I have a crude intuitive feeling that the human mind might be one of those non-discrete non-linear systems where some behaviors are difficult to approximate algorithmically in a satisfactory way.

I know that this statement ought to be made more precise, but the sun is setting, so it won't be today...

@dougmerritt @maxpool @screwlisp

@vnikolov
Yes, but the brain perforce must use finite precision. There do not appear to be any infinities nor infinitesimals anywhere in the universe.

So some, like Penrose, have sought to put the hard-to-explain mind in quantum processes such as microtubules.

The jury is still out on such attempts, but I personally think that the human mind can be adequately simulated on conventional computers -- some day, not today.

And it might turn out to be helpful to have true randomness available (which we do have on e.g. Linux systems today, just not at a very high bit rate), but I don't think it would be absolutely essential.

@maxpool @screwlisp

Just to explain a little what I am thinking about:

If quantum effects are significant as far as cognitive processes are concerned, then we have infinities.

Regardless of that, we have the frequencies of neuron firing and frequency is usually modelled as a real number.
Then we have (very generally speaking) various thermodynamic processes in the brain and modelling such processes also is usually done with real numbers.

Hence my intuition.
Obviously I know too little about the current state of the art with theoretical models in neurophysiology and thus about what can be said so far regarding successful algorithmic modelling.
The latter obviously depends on the nature of the models, not merely on the presence of real numbers, but such presence requires care.

@dougmerritt @maxpool @screwlisp

@vnikolov @dougmerritt @screwlisp

I recognize that it's a intuition many people have, I just don't understand why.

1. It's not spirituality. We are just machines of hypercomputation kind.

2. There is no need. Nothing in human capabilities or easy problem of consciousness requires it as far as I know it.

3. It will not solve consciousness in the hard problem or give it any light.

@dougmerritt
Aside, earlier were you making the point between random numbers - there is bernoulli sequence written down on my infinite tape somewhere and random numbers - I can acquire randomness externally, at which point you were saying well, if I can just acquire answers externally...

@maxpool @vnikolov

@maxpool @dougmerritt @screwlisp Strictly, infinite state machines. The tape is infinitely long. This is why no physical computer can ever be strictly Turing complete, but since you can't compute over infinite memory in finite time, this is a difference which makes no difference to the halting problem.
@dougmerritt @screwlisp @maxpool This is a profound misunderstanding. If a program is programmed to yield a wrong answer, and a Turing machine executes it correctly, then it will yield a wrong answer. That is the correct behaviour.

@simon_brooke
Yes it is correct behavior, no the result is not true.

I suppose I should have said "the normal behavior of human minds is not Turing equvalent; they are not normally emulating Turing machines, nor anything else that yields the correct answer any time that a Turing machine does"

@screwlisp @maxpool