Small models also found the vulnerabilities that Mythos found

https://aisle.com/blog/ai-cybersecurity-after-mythos-the-jagged-frontier

AI Cybersecurity After Mythos: The Jagged Frontier

Why the moat is the system, not the model

AISLE

> We took the specific vulnerabilities Anthropic showcases in their announcement, isolated the relevant code, and ran them through small, cheap, open-weights models. Those models recovered much of the same analysis. Eight out of eight models detected Mythos's flagship FreeBSD exploit, including one with only 3.6 billion active parameters costing $0.11 per million tokens.

Impressive, and very valuable work, but isolating the relevant code changes the situation so much that I'm not sure it's much of the same use case.

Being able to dump an entire code base and have the model scan it is they type of situation where it opens up vulnerability scans to an entirely larger class of people.

This is from the first of the caveats that they list:

> Scoped context: Our tests gave models the vulnerable function directly, often with contextual hints (e.g., "consider wraparound behavior"). A real autonomous discovery pipeline starts from a full codebase with no hints. The models' performance here is an upper bound on what they'd achieve in a fully autonomous scan. That said, a well-designed scaffold naturally produces this kind of scoped context through its targeting and iterative prompting stages, which is exactly what both AISLE's and Anthropic's systems do.

That's why their point is what the subheadline says, that the moat is the system, not the model.

Everybody so far here seems to be misunderstanding the point they are making.

I get what you're saying, but I think this is still missing something pretty critical.

The smaller models can recognize the bug when they're looking right at it, that seems to be verified. And with AISLE's approach you can iteratively feed the models one segment at a time cheaply. But if a bug spans multiple segments, the small model doesn't have the breadth of context to understand those segments in composite.

The advantage of the larger model is that it can retain more context and potentially find bugs that require more code context than one segment at a time.

That said, the bugs showcased in the mythos paper all seemed to be shallow bugs that start and end in a single input segment, which is why AISLE was able to find them. But having more context in the window theoretically puts less shallow bugs within range for the model.

I think the point they are making, that the model doesn't matter as much as the harness, stands for shallow bugs but not for vulnerability discovery in general.

OK, consider a for loop that goes through your repo, then goes through each file, and then goes through each common vulnerability...

Is Mythos some how more powerful than just a recursive foreloop aka, "agentic" review. You can run `open code run --command` with a tailored command for whatever vulnerabilities you're looking for.

newer models have larger context windows, and more stable reasoning across larger context windows.

If you point your model directly at the thing you want it to assess, and it doesn't have to gather any additional context you're not really testing those things at all.

Say you point kimi and opus at some code and give them an agentic looping harness with code review tools. They're going to start digging into the code gathering context by mapping out references and following leads.

If the bug is really shallow, the model is going to get everything it needs to find it right away, neither of them will have any advantage.

If the bug is deeper, requires a lot more code context, Opus is going to be able to hold onto a lot more information, and it's going to be a lot better at reasoning across all that information. That's a test that would actually compare the models directly.

Mythos is just a bigger model with a larger context window and, presumably, better prioritization and stronger attention mechanisms.

Harnesses are basically doing this better than just adding more context. Every time, REGARDLESS OF MODEL SIZE, you add context, you are increasing the odds the model will get confused about any set of thoughts. So context size is no longer some magic you just sprinkle on these things and they suddenly dont imagine things.

So, it's the old ML join: It's just a bunch of if statements. As others are pointing out, it's quite probably that the model isn't the thing doing the heavy lifting, it's the harness feeding the context. Which this link shows that small models are just as capabable.

Which means: Given a appropiately informed senior programmer and a day or two, I posit this is nothing more spectacular than a for loop invoking a smaller, free, local, LLM to find the same issues. It doesn't matter what you think about the complexity, because the "agentic" format can create a DAG that will be followable by a small model. All that context you're taking in makes oneshot inspections more probable, but much like how CPUs have go from 0-5 ghz, then stalled, so too has the context value.

Agent loops are going to do much the same with small models, mostly from the context poisoning that happens every time you add a token it raises the chance of false positives.

I know you're right that there's a saturation point for context size, but it's not just context size that the larger models have, it's better grounding within that as a result of stronger, more discriminative attention patterns.

I'm not saying you're not going to drive confusion by overloading context, but the number of tokens required to trigger that failure mode in opus is going to be a lot higher than the number for gpt-oss-20b.

I'm pretty sure a model that can run on a cellphone is going to cap out it's context window long before opus or mythos would hit the point of diminishing returns on context overload. I think using a lower quality model with far fewer / noisier weights and less precise attention is going to drive false positives way before adding context to a SOTA model will.

You can even see here, AISLE had to print a retraction because someone checked their work and found that just pointing gpt-oss-20b at the patched version generated FP consistently: https://x.com/ChaseBrowe32432/status/2041953028027379806

Chase Brower (@ChaseBrowe32432) on X

@stanislavfort I am still extremely skeptical of this approach. I took the *patched* code snippet of the svc_rpc_gss_validate function, fed it to gpt-oss-20b, and it... incorrectly suggested that the vulnerability was still present (even though the code does a correct bounds check now).

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