Penguin Rebellion2d ago

It is useful to keep in mind there can never be any kind of actual end-to-end encryption (#E2EE).

Your understanding of "end" is probably deliberately ignorant.

While you understandably so wish to believe the "end" was in the respective minds of the conversation partners, it is factually and technically located in the hardware and software of the devices used.

Which opens up a myriad of surveillance options, from sinister keyloggers; to simply glancing at your screens; to "AI" "assistants" "summarizing" what you're receiving, and allegedly just "fleshing out" what you're sending.

Even if conversation data was transmitted, "end-to-end encrypted", between brain implants, the producers or vendors of such implants would still happily provide backdoors for "law enforcement".

Show threadWolfgang Müller (DE:er/EN:he)1d ago
@penguinrebellion The solution to this is open hardware. But how can you have *really* open hardware that a human, completely trustworthy, organisation can understand?
Show threadPenguin Rebellion

@muellerwhh

Good question. Maybe having a walk in the forest is easier to arrange for, and "implement".

Apr 7 at 8:47amWeb
Show threadWolfgang Müller (DE:er/EN:he)1d ago
@penguinrebellion Yes, but not remotely. So being without said open hardware is quite a disadvantage in setting up clandestine information exchange.
Show threadWolfgang Müller (DE:er/EN:he)1d ago
@penguinrebellion The interesting bit would be: How to set up written communication under the assumption that networking devices are not trustworthy but that you may be able to build things whose output you can verify and that do not fly into your face.