before i continue, i also want to note that the pdf doesn't have any text layer for some reason. this means it's invisible to blind people. i see https://signal-contingency-plan.info/, but that has different text than the pdf. i ran it through pdfsandwich and uploaded it to a third party hosting service: https://drive.proton.me/urls/CSE8QNNPS8#mG2gwPITVJ4S.

i don't see any reason why the pdf authoring tool wouldn't provide the text itself, but whatever.

the zine itself contains a variety of misleading technical jargon (who can i blame for this?), and finally makes some directly invalid claims:

The use of email protocols to send messages means that a government or ISP can't simply block the entire Delta Chat protocol on the network, without blocking all email on that network.

network censorship by nation-state actors is far deeper than blocking a single port. this argument is textbook security through obscurity and is demonstrably false. and in particular, it plays upon the fundamental con of delta chat: if it is "just email", then it has the flaws of email, including plaintext sender/recipient/subject line.

but it's not: see https://delta.chat/en/2024-03-25-crypto-analysis-securejoin#hardening-e-mail-header-protections-and-encryption. i do not doubt its encryption works, but claiming that it is indistinguishable from email is inarguably false:

To protect Subject header Delta Chat and other email clients such as Thunderbird and K-9 Mail replace Subject with “…” or “Encrypted Message”

matching emails with the subject "Encrypted message" is very much within the ability of a nation-state network censor! this is deeply unserious! if people rely on delta chat in the ways described, the worst-case scenario isn't just getting their messages blocked, they can be silently tracked by a global passive adversary. signal is actually strictly better than this as a result of their sealed sender.

delta chat is riding on security through obscurity in order to make false claims, and that's not remotely trustworthy. i cannot overstate how much these kinds of statements damage the credibility of the entire project.

but let's talk about signal now.

on signal: the emphasis on signal's cloud infrastructure is deeply misleading and draws an utterly false distinction:

The US government can instead try to force Signal’s providers to stop routing their traffic, resolving their domains, or hosting their servers.

very true! the us government could declare war on signal, and unilaterally force these major corporations to halt service to signal.