The FCC maintains a list of equipment and services (Covered List)
that have been determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the
national security

Recently, malicious state and non-state sponsored cyber attackers
have increasingly leveraged the vulnerabilities in small and home
office routers produced abroad to carry out direct attacks against
American civilians in their homes.


Vulnerabilities have nothing to do with country of manufacture. They have always been due to manufacturers' crap security practices. Security experts have been trying to call attention to this problem for 2 decades.

Manufacturers have never had to care about security because no Gov agency would ever mandate secure firmware. This includes the FCC which license their devices and the FTC who (until recently) had the direct mandate to protect consumers.

Our most recent step backward was to gut those agencies of any ability to provide consumer oversight. All they they can do now is craft protectionist policies that favor campaign donors.

The US has a bazillion devices with crap security because we set ourselves up for this.

> Manufacturers have never had to care about security because no Gov agency would ever mandate secure firmware.

The problem is that "secure firmware" is a relativistic statement. You ship something with no known bugs and then someone finds one.

What you need is not a government mandate for infallibility, it's updates. But then vendors want to stop issuing them after 3 years, meanwhile many consumers will keep using the device for 15. And "require longer support" doesn't fix it because many of the vendors will go out of business.

What you need is the ability for consumers to replace the firmware.

That solves the problem in three ways. First, when the company goes out of business you can still put a supported third party firmware on the device. Second, you can do that immediately, because the open source firmwares have a better security record than the OEMs to begin with. And third, then the device is running a widely used open source firmware instead of a custom device-specific proprietary black box, which makes it easier for the government or anyone else who is so inclined to find vulnerabilities and patch them.

"You ship something with no known bugs and then someone finds one."

You managed to say that with a straight face!

Let's keep this ... non partisan. You might recall that many vendors have decided to embed static creds in firmware and only bother patch them out when caught out.

How on earth is embedded creds in any way: "no known bugs"?

I think we are on the same side (absolutely) but please don't allow the buggers any credibility!

> How on earth is embedded creds in any way: "no known bugs"?

You misunderstand how organizational knowledge works. You see, it doesn't.

Some embeds the credentials, someone else ships the product. The first person doesn't even necessarily still work there at that point.

Remember that time NASA sent a Mars orbiter to Mars and then immediately crashed it because some of them were using pounds and the others newtons? Literally rocket scientists.

The best we know how to do here is to keep the incentives aligned so the people who suffer the consequences of something can do something about it. And in this case the people who suffer the consequences are the consumers, not the company that may have already ceased to exist, so we need to give the consumers a good way to fix it.

> What you need is the ability for consumers to replace the firmware.

> That solves the problem in three ways.

That alleviates the problem, but definitely doesn't solve it. Updates are still required, and most people will never update devices they don't directly interact with.

Auto-update obviously.
Which introduces new security risks, but more importantly, the consumer has to configure the device to use open source firmware, and set up auto updates, unless the device is being auto updated by the device manufacturer and forces all of their customers to switch to the new firmware, which seems very unlikely.
The concept of community firmware seems like a huge cop-out that allows companies to externalize costs. And it probably won't help security because 99% of devices will never get the third-party firmware installed anyway.

If they were trying to save costs they would ship the community firmware on the device to begin with because then they wouldn't have to write and maintain their own. The community welcomes them to externalize those costs onto the people with better incentives to improve the software.

What they're actually trying to do is obsolete the devices faster because then they won't add new protocols or other software-only features to older devices so you have to buy a new one, or only expose features in more expensive models that the less expensive hardware would also be capable of doing. Which is all the more reason for us to not have that.

And if they were required to allow anyone to replace the firmware then you would get companies reflashing and selling them that way from the store because the free firmware has more advertisable features. There's a reason you can go to major PC OEMs and pick between Windows, Linux and "don't even install one" and the reason is that if you give customers a choice, they generally don't want their software to be made by the OEM.

It could be part of dissolution of the company to mandate community firmware. But it depends on their licenses…

Anyhow, this is a common enough practice. Many companies that provide infrastructure type software and sell to Fortune 500 companies often have a clause whereby they deliver their software to their customers if the shut down.

We don't care about their licenses; that's their problem. If they need firmware with a license that allows them to redistribute it there are plenty of free ones to choose from.

And you can't wait until after they're dead to have them do something. By then they're gone or judgment proof because they're already bankrupt. Especially when you're talking about companies that aren't in the jurisdiction because you can't even make them do anything when they're already not shipping products to you anymore. It has to be from Day 1.

> It has to be from Day 1.

There was a promising design from Azure Sphere for 10 years of IoT device Linux security updates from Microsoft, even if the IoT vendor went out of business. This required a hardware design to isolate vendor userspace code from device security code, so they could be updated independently. Could be resurrected as open standard with FRAND licensing.

Somebody has to pay for the support. There is no free meal.

Enterprise must be able to pay for support for as long as they use devices. Solved.

I can only think of requiring the devices to be serviceable, as you say. The absolute only way I can think of charging the consumers, ie the owners, is to charge a tax on internet connections. Then the government would pay somehow vulnerability hunters working along patchers, who can oversee each other.

Consumers are tricky: if you include support in the sale price, the company will grab the money and run in 3 or 5 years; and some companies will sell cheaper because they know they won't provide support.

> Somebody has to pay for the support. There is no free meal.

The problem is not that people need a free meal. The problem is that people need the ability to eat some other food when the OEM's restaurant is closed or unsatisfactory.

>The problem is that "secure firmware" is a relativistic statement.

No it isn't, software formally verified to EAL7 is guaranteed to be secure.

I would like to introduce you to Spectre and Rowhammer.
Secure software won't protect you from insecure hardware, which also needs to be formally verified for a secure system.