Cyber.mil serving file downloads using TLS certificate which expired 3 days ago

https://www.cyber.mil/stigs/downloads

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Is there anything inherently insecure about an expired cert other than your browser just complaining about it?
To prevent abuse, for example to prevent an old owner of domain to have a valid certificate for the domain indefinitely after transfer.
Not inherently, but it can introduce risk. Such as a bad actor using an old expired certificate it was able to acquire to play man-in-the-middle. But if that is happening you have bigger problems.
No, but it reflects poorly on the maintainer. Plus, any browser complaint contributes to error fatigue. Users shouldn't just ignore these, and we shouldn't encourage them to ignore them just because we fail at securing our websites.
“No, but it reflects badly because it’s an error, and because it’s an error it contributes to error fatigue, which is bad” is a very verbose way to say that you don’t have an answer.

Your comment history reflects a persistent approach: insulting the person you're replying to.

Please reflect on the site guidelines. https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

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There is a reason why certs have expiration dates. It's to control the damage after the site owner or someone else in the cert chain messes up. That doesn't mean expired certs are inherently not secure, only that you should still care about it and do your best to avoid using expired certs.
On the contrary, it's a very precise answer.

Expiries are a defence-in-depth that exist primarily for crypt hygiene, for example to protect from compromised keys. If the private key material is well protected, the risk is very low.

However, an org (particularaly a .mil) not renewing its TLS certs screams of extreme incompetence (which is exactly what expiries are meant to protect you from.)

>screams of extreme incompetence

Not unheard of with the military

Inherently, not really. An expired, unsigned or even incorrect (as in, the wrong domain is listed) certificate can be used to secure a connection just as well as a perfectly valid certificate.

Rather, the purpose of all of these systems (in theory) is to verify that the certificate belongs to the correct entity, and not some third party that happens to impersonate the original. It's not just security, but also verification: how do I know that the server that responds to example.com controls the domain name example.com .

The expiration date mainly exists to protect against 2 kinds of attacks: the first is that, if it didn't exist, if you somehow obtained a valid certificate for example.com, it'd just be valid forever. All I'd need to do is get a certificate for example.com at some point, sell the domain to another party and then I'd be able to impersonate the party that owns example.com forever. An expiration date limits the scope of that attack to however long the issued certificate was valid for (since I wouldn't be able to re-verify the certificate.)

The second is to reduce the value of a leaked certificate. If you assume that any certificate issued will leak at some point, regardless of how it's secured (because you don't know how it's stored), then the best thing you can do is make it so that the certificate has a limited lifespan. It's not a problem if a certificate from say, a month ago, leaks if the lifespan of the certificate was only 3 days.

Those are the on paper reasons to distrust expired certificates, but in practice the discussion is a bit more nuanced in ways you can't cleanly express in technical terms. In the case of a .mil domain (where the ways it can resolve are inherently limited because the entire TLD is owned by a single entity - the US military), it's mostly just really lazy and unprofessional. The US military has a budget of "yes"; they should be able to keep enough tech support around to renew their certificates both on time and to ensure that all their devices can handle cert rotations.

Similarly, within a network you fully control, the issues with a broken certificate setup mostly just come down to really annoying warnings rather than any actual insecurity; it's hard to argue that the device is being impersonated when it's literally sitting right across from you and you see the lights on it blink when you connect to it.

Most of the issues with bad certificate handling come into play only when you're dealing with an insecure network, where there's a ton of different parties that could plausibly resolve your request... like most of the internet. (The exception being specialty domains like .gov/.mil and other such TLDs that are owned by singular entities.)