🚨 fedi entities: NIST has a glossary entry for you

An individual person, organization, device, or process. Used interchangeably with party.

🥳

Two processes are equivalent if the same output is produced when the same values are input to each process

ok, cool

(either as input parameters, as values made
available during the process, or both).

literally what the fuck

A function on bit strings in which the output can be extended to any desired length.

any length. ok

as long as the specified output length is
sufficiently long to prevent trivial attacks

wouldn't really say any

oh my GOD

trusted third party (TTP)
An entity other than the key pair owner and the verifier that is trusted by the owner, the verifier, or both. Sometimes shortened to “trusted party.”

is it? is it sometimes shortened to that?

signature validation
The mathematical verification of the digital signature along with obtaining the appropriate assurances (e.g., public-key validity, private-key possession, etc.).

LMAO literally "the math part plus the government surveillance"

PyPI has done everything right, including purposely removing frontend support for PGP years ago.

literally intended to make you think an Event had happened. nope!

Type casting. The variable 𝑥 is assigned a value in a set 𝑆 that is constructed from
the value of an expression 𝑦 in a possibly different set 𝑇. The set 𝑇 and the mapping
from 𝑇 to 𝑆 are not explicitly specified, but they should be obvious from the context
in which this statement appears.

this is like. a math notation? "should be obvious from the context" honey no you need to tell me about this hash scheme and shut up

The Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) is a specific isomorphism between the rings 𝑅𝑞 and 𝑇𝑞.

that is nippon telephone and teletype

The motivation for using NTT is that multiplication is considerably faster in the ring 𝑇𝑞

that's good. i was worried there was any history of ulterior motives for NIST choosing a specific set of parameters to construct a ring

In the HashML-DSA version, the message input to ML-DSA.Sign_internal is the result of applying either a hash function or a XOF to the content to be signed.

For some cryptographic modules that generate ML-DSA signatures, hashing the message in step 6 of ML-DSA.Sign_internal may result in unacceptable performance if the message 𝑀 is large.

this fucking high school science project is safe against quantum computers which not only will exist, but could even exist RIGHT NOW!

which is why we are doing this in the open together

come on man don't do this

For some use cases, this may be addressed by signing a digest of the message along with some domain separation information rather than signing the message directly. This version of ML-DSA is known as “pre-hash” ML-DSA or HashML-DSA . In general, the “pure” ML-DSA version is preferred.

CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY RELEVANT

These algorithms are used to support the key compression optimization of ML-DSA.

"compression"

if you could "compress" it, it wouldn't be "encrypted"

OPTIMIZATION!!!!!!!

They involve dropping the 𝑑 low-order bits of each coefficient of the polynomial vector 𝐭 from the public key using the function Power2Round.

sure that's fine they're lower order right that's fine right

However, in order to make this optimization work,

that's what i wanna hear

additional information called a “hint” needs to be provided in the signature

i dare you to use a single normal name

to allow the verifier to reconstruct enough of the information in the dropped public-key bits to verify the signature.

hm is that what the verifier is doing? reconstructing information? tbh don't care

This standard makes use of the functions SHAKE256 and SHAKE128, as defined in FIPS 202 [7]. While FIPS 202 specifies these functions as inputting and outputting bit strings, most implementations treat inputs and outputs as byte strings.

honey fips 202 is not the part you need to cite

literally

Using this approach, security strength is not described by a single number, such as “128 bits of security.”

this is gonna be good

Instead, each ML-DSA parameter set is claimed to be at least as secure as a generic block cipher with a prescribed key size or a generic hash function with a prescribed output length.

you fucking prick that's the same thing fuck you

YES!!!! YES!!!!

More precisely, it is claimed that the computational resources needed to break ML-DSA are greater than or equal to the computational resources needed to break the block cipher or hash function when these computational resources are estimated using any realistic model of computation.

yeah see it's the quantum factor

oh they set themselves up so hard

Different models of computation can be more or less realistic and, accordingly, lead to more or less accurate estimates of security strength.

nodding yes jack nicholson gif

zero normal names

For the default “hedged” version of ML-DSA signing

shut the fuck up you're not cute

for the optional deterministic variant,

that's definitely a line to only write out in the pseudocode of algorithm 2 and nowhere else. bet you wish you could do that to my code huh

bro oh my god
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/commit/?h=keys-pqc&id=2c62068ac86bdd917a12eef49ba82ec8b091208b

It may be that this is inadvisable.

you can't say that man. your code is on my laptop and you are actively obfuscating it in linux-fs

Note that whilst ML-DSA does allow for an "external mu", CMS doesn't yet have that standardised.

hey is it good when the IETF refers to the CMS and doesn't link it

Errata Exist

oh thanks

This is because in most situations, CMS signatures are computed over a set of signed attributes that contain a hash of the content, rather than being computed over the message content itself.

see the thing about the IETF? they never let me down

ML-DSA signature generation and verification is significantly faster than SLH-DSA.

no clue what SLH is but it must be a new form of quantum

@hko i was wondering why i had never ever heard that word that sounds like aliens making fun of english "repudiation"

This is known as non-repudiation since the signatory cannot easily repudiate the signature at a later time.

you know what? i can't repudiate that

@hipsterelectron oh yes, ml-dsa and slh-dsa are both signing algorithms.
The latter is ridiculously heavy.

In the OpenPGP pqc draft, the first of the two is only allowed as one part of a "composite" signature that includes a traditional signature (e.g. ml-dsa + ed25519)