i was gonna say "oh maybe he's C-brained" but no you can still do sizeof(arr) in C

they're describing this so generically as if it's theoretical and new

Practical Relevance of Randomness Manipulation
In addition to exposures of locally stored state secrets, randomness for generat-
ing (new) secrets is often considered vulnerable. This is motivated by numerous
attacks in practice against randomness sources (e.g., [11]), randomness genera-
tors (e.g., [23,7]), or exposures of random coins (e.g., [22]). Most theoretic ap-
proaches try to model this threat by allowing an adversary to reveal attacked
random coins of a protocol execution (as it was also conducted in related work
on ratcheting). This, however, assumes that the attacked protocol honestly and
uniformly samples its random coins (either from a high-entropy source or using
a random oracle) and that these coins are only afterwards leaked to the attacker.
In contrast, practically relevant attacks against bad randomness generators or
low-entropy sources (e.g., [11,23,7]) change the distribution from which random
coins are sampled. Consequently, this threat is only covered by a security model if
considered adversaries are also allowed to influence the execution’s (distribution
of) random coins. Thus, it is important to consider randomness manipulation
(instead of reveal), if attacks against randomness are regarded practically rele-
vant.

and i mean it is i think since this paper described it

Examples for
countermeasures are replacing bad randomness generators via software updates

simply sudo pacman -S openssl

Please note our distinction between key agreement and ratcheted key exchange protocols.

oh i am so fucking ready for this i am RIVETED

While the security provided by Signal is sufficient in most real-world scenarios,

this is the START of the sentence

we focus in this work on the theoretic analysis of the (optimally secure) primitive ratcheting with respect to its instantiability by smaller building
blocks.

Consequently, fixing syntax and oracle definitions, no stronger security definitions exist.

can you say that? is that allowed? this claim was not under dispute in the 60-page paper that sucks

the paragraph actually clarifies

All of the above mentioned works define security optimally with respect to
their syntax definition and the adversary’s access to the primitive execution
(modeled via oracles in the security game). This is reached by declaring secrets
insecure iff the adversary conducted an unpreventable/trivial attack against
them (i.e., a successful attack that no instantiation can prevent). Consequently,
fixing syntax and oracle definitions, no stronger security definitions exist.

Thus, they do not require recovery from state
exposures – which are a part of impersonation attacks

the ratcheting paper using an em dash to indicate a significant addendum

state exposures => impersonation attacks is described regarding random state, which then can be used to infer the subsequent result of an "ephemeral" key, salt, etc

so: is it just a coincidence that these terms also directly bear upon anonymity

Furthermore, both works neglect bad randomness as an attack vector

this paper continues and i'm more and more convinced

ok so no it's not a coincidence but it's a separate mechanism entirely

https://circumstances.run/@hipsterelectron/116269867302883821

the analogy my brain was making was "impersonation" => deanonymization, which is not a thing

random state is both consumed and constructed in the process of constant-bandwidth noise generation

"state exposure" was another mistake. i don't really know that the constant-bandwidth noise is an obvious target for attack, given that we can construct the interface which describes a baud rate and then sends bytes we like while filling the rest with noise and avoids timing variations. this doesn't seem problematic but it wouldn't be something exposed directly to like the cpu or threading or whatever. this is solvable and someone else i'm sure has considered this

the "state exposure" i was thinking of was the state of message progress that links message source to sink i.e. alice to bob, s to t, me to you

i think that's not the attack that would be relevant but rather identifying the variants of message channel used between neighboring peers, and from there inferring types of messages

so that does make constant-bandwidth noise the target for attack. which is good because i didn't know where that term was going and it seems like an eminently solvable problem

i think source onion routing with progress notifications and route status seems pretty solid with the right choice of responses

also hero-coded behavior from this behavior in a footnote

We explicitly cite the extended version [19] for results that are not captured in the
CRYPTO 2018 proceedings [20].

there is of course two version of the initial (not eurocrypt) paper with the cryptographer fuckboy, one of which references i'm pretty sure an earlier version of the same paper (the initial) at a conference, specifically to justify "40 bytes" (no context) as "from signal". earlier version of this paper? if you read it? specifically says "oh yeah signal doesn't do user research so i created this interaction graph with uniform distributions to model sender and recipient interactions"

spends like half a page on this:
(1) like "oh yeah signal doesn't do user research" doesn't sound like the most tech bro way to say "i didn't ask users because i don't care" and pretend anyone thinks signal is gonna start adding malware if they ask users or provide some opt-in?
(2) zero citations for the entire stretch, like LITERALLY NO ONE has EVER modelled sending a message back and forth. probabilistically.
(3) choice of uniform distributions for whether someone sends a message over the hour/day and absolutely zero attempt to acknowledge that a """mathematician""" could spend a whole paper on distributional assumptions, particularly CRYPTOGRAPHER

so then he's like ok now i'm going to forget that these are random variables and create this other set of models defined in terms of these distributional assumptions you know what i need to find the way he abuses italics too

yeah love this shit https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity25-auerbach.pdf

A new method to quantify security.

sir i am a scientist we don't need new methods to quantify things that is the last thing anyone needs

oh this is so great

The mismatch between epochs and compromised messages discussed above
will have a rather simple solution in this work,

definitely not allowed to say that about the paper which is currently on page 2 and hasn't finished talking about how simple it is

where we will define SM security

brain destroying acronym usage. "secure messaging". defined as?

applications, including WhatsApp, Signal, Google RCS, and Facebook Messenger, have taken over the world.

defined as corporations. ok

Used by billions of people daily, these appli-
cations achieve extremely strong security properties,

honestly who do you think you are? google? facebook? whatsapp? billions => security?

ok. hit me with fuckboy. define SM security

in a way which explicitly looks at the set
of exposed messages.

it's SO much more fucking obnoxious to italicize half a sentence in the math latex font

explicitly looks at the set of exposed messages

how "explicitly"? duh. that's what the simulations based on our distributional assumptions are for