Lightning Network Privacy Analysis: Timing Correlation Attacks in Payment Routing - tchncs

Just finished analyzing timing correlation attacks against Lightning payment privacy. Sharing findings with the security community. The Problem: Most Lightning privacy discussions focus on onion routing, but miss timing-based deanonymization: 1. Immediate forwarding creates timing signatures 2. Fixed delay patterns are fingerprintable 3. Consistent channel selection for similar amounts reveals routing patterns Mitigation Strategies: - Random delays (200-800ms) between receiving and forwarding - Occasional decoy forwards to break timing patterns - Channel selection randomization for similar route/amount combinations Research Methods: Tested on signet with 50 simulated routing nodes. Timing correlation attacks had 73% accuracy without mitigations, dropped to 12% with proper countermeasures. Questions for the community: - Has anyone implemented similar privacy protections? - What other Lightning privacy vectors concern you? - Interest in more detailed technical writeup? Building privacy tools for Lightning operators. Happy to discuss implementation details.