Matt BlazeMar 14

RE: https://esq.social/@SuffolkLITLab/116229521620498862

The ProPublica piece is kind of a mess - it doesn't even mention CISA by name - but some of the issues are concerning. In particular, the proposals are extremely vague.

They want to ban "voting machines" (under what authority?). Does that mean touchscreen DREs? Fine, that's what virtually all technical experts have recommended for a while. Or do they mean any electronic tabulation, including optical scan paper ballots (widely used and amenable to reliable post-election audits)?

Show threadMatt BlazeMar 14
One gets the impression from the article that the current CISA leadership is focused more on re-litigating 2020 than on meaningfully helping states improve their election security, but hopefully they can be nudged toward advocating practical, proven, high-impact reforms, like default use of hand-marked paper ballots and routine post-election risk-limiting audits.
Show threadMatt BlazeMar 15
It's also worth noting that DHS/CISA has essentially no authority over elections, which are run by states. Their role is advisory, particularly recommending best practices and disseminating threat intelligence.
Show threadMatt BlazeMar 15

Also, it's simply too late to make any major changes to election systems this year. Primaries have already started, and the general election is in eight months.

I think it's reasonable to suspect that the play here is simply to set the stage for casting doubt on election outcomes that they regard as unfavorable.

Show threadMatt BlazeMar 15

Once again:

- There are security weaknesses in parts of US election systems, particularly those that use paperless touchscreen voting machines, and we should absolutely address them.

- Fortunately, there is no evidence to date that these technical weaknesses have ever been exploited to alter a US election outcome.

- We know how to secure elections! Paper ballots, optical scanners, post-election risk-limiting audits.

- There's been a great deal of progress, but there's still work to do.

Show threadD.C.U.K.Mar 15
@mattblaze Are there really voting machines in use out there that do not at least print out paper copies of the voter's inputs? That seems like malpractice. It seems like the most obvious thing that they should either modify or print out a paper ballot for the sake of stuff like hand recounts and record keeping.
Show threadMatt BlazeMar 15
@dutch_connection_uk There are, though they are falling out of favor in most of the US.
Show threadD.C.U.K.Mar 16
@mattblaze I'm sorry for the follow up, but are any of the hold-outs that still use such machines in sensitive swingy places where there could potentially be some incident of national significance, or is this mostly in safer places where it's less likely to matter?
Show threadMatt BlazeMar 16
@dutch_connection_uk Verified Voting has a reasonably up to date list by state and county: https://verifiedvoting.org/verifier/#mode/navigate/map/voteEquip/mapType/ppEquip/year/2026
Verifier

Verified Voting
Show threadD.C.U.K.
@mattblaze Thank you, this is a great resource! It looks like it is indeed the case that such machines are not in any swing states, which is very reassuring.
Mar 16 at 5:38amWeb