Recently, Trump himself posted on Truth Social, “Iran tried to interfere in 2020, 2024 elections to stop Trump, and now faces renewed war with United States.”
The draft order also directs the Justice Department to investigate
“all documented or observed claims”
involving
“security compliance, foreign espionage or foreign interference”
in past elections.
But in that regard the administration is already ahead:
The FBI just this week subpoenaed records related to Maricopa County, Arizona,
and last month it raided a Fulton County, Georgia, elections center and left with election records.
“Great!!!” the president wrote in a social media post linking to an article from a right-wing site about the developments in Arizona.
The question of whether the president must prove to the courts that an emergency truly exists where he has declared one is still unresolved.
But in any case, these fishing expeditionists
—who have been markedly less interested in adversaries’ actual attempted interference in elections
—seem to hope to find “evidence” of mischief that would conveniently be addressed by the particular reforms they favor,
-- such as decertifying voting machines or banning mail-in ballots.
(It remains unclear how stringent voter ID requirements relate even to the fantasies they’ve conjured up.)
Regardless of whatever emergency the White House does or doesn’t manage to concoct,
Trump faces a bigger problem:
The president can’t simply declare a national emergency and then do whatever he wants.
The National Emergencies Act (NEA) mandates that the president identify a specific statute that vests in him specific powers.
The 2018 EO relies on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
That makes sense, for the 2018 EO,
and it made sense for other EOs that used IEEPA to target foreign entities for tampering with elections or engaging in other malicious cyberactivity.
After all, IEEPA is an economic powers law
—it’s in the name
—and the order exercises the economic power of sanctions.
This power is expressly available to the executive under Section 203 of that act (50 U.S.C. §1702).
Authorities include investigating, regulating or prohibiting imports, exports and asset transfers,
in addition to freezing assets, blocking property and interests in property and barring U.S. persons from entering into transactions related to said assets and property.
The government can also “confiscate” property,
but only when the United States is engaged in armed conflict with the foreign country or foreign nationals to whom it belongs.
It’s the property portion of the statute that MAGA-aligned activists may believe could enable the president to go after certain voting machines.
But that analysis could only possibly apply to machines that are owned by foreign entities
—and not any foreign entities, but foreign entities related to interference in U.S. elections.
None of the vendors who exercise a near-monopoly over America voting would fit that category.
As for mail-in ballots, there’s certainly no foreign property interest there.
What’s more, IEEPA explicitly excludes
“any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value.”
As valuable as votes may be to the politicians they’re cast for, that’s obviously not what Congress meant.
The draft order also explicitly mentions two other statutes:
The Defense Production Act of 1850
and the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014.
The latter isn’t even an emergency statute,
but its purpose is to ensure the security of federal agencies’ critical systems security is up to snuff
—not to wrest federal control over systems from the states.
Ironically, the order as proposed may violate FISMA with its manifold “transparency” requirements
opening sensitive federal databases up to federal scrutiny.
The Defense Production Act, meanwhile, gives the president the power to mobilize private industry toward the public ends of national defense and emergency preparedness.
It does not give the president any power to push the states around in the same manner.
Some of those involved with the draft order have also indicated they don’t think there’s any need for the president to specify a statute under the NEA at all.
On the contrary, they argue the president can declare a national emergency and then do whatever he wants,
as long as the evidence for the emergency is there.
That argument misreads the NEA
—a Vietnam War-era regime passed to address concerns about presidents overusing or abusing their emergency powers
—as a statute that broadens executive authority rather than restricts it.