jasonweiserMar 13

Probably want to stop using Booklore...

https://sh.itjust.works/post/56734023

Probably want to stop using Booklore... - sh.itjust.works

Just a PSA. See this thread [https://www.reddit.com/r/selfhosted/comments/1rs275q/psa_think_hard_before_you_deploy_booklore/] Sorry to link to Reddit, but not only is the dev sloppily using using Claude to do something like 20k line PRs, but they are completely crashing out, banning people from the Discord (actually I think they wiped everything from Discord now), and accusing people forking their code of theft. It’s a bummer because the app was pretty good… thankfully Calibre-web and Kavita still exist.

Show threadlambaliciousMar 13
Quick! Someone add it to Open Slopware!
open-slopware

Free/Open Source Software tainted by LLM developers/developed by genAI boosters, along with alternatives. Fork of the repo by @gen-ai-transparency after its deletion.

Codeberg.org
Show threadnfreakMar 13
Man this list is depressing. Good to have handy though. Sad to see SearXNG and a few others on here.
Show threadAtroposMar 13
Searxng? Fuck, guess I’m just not pulling a new container.
Show threadnfreakMar 13
There is this that popped up the other day, but I haven’t looked into it at all to see if it’s vibecoded or not: github.com/fccview/degoog
GitHub - fccview/degoog: Search engine aggregator with a comprehensive plugin/extension system

Search engine aggregator with a comprehensive plugin/extension system - fccview/degoog

GitHub
Show threadPoliteDudeInTheMood
It’s not, the second I cloned it and gave codex access it found a whole whack of privacy issues. This was 100% human coded
Mar 15 at 3:38amWeb
Show threadfccview6d ago
degoog Dev here, definitely not vibecoded. Would you be able to tell me all these whack of privacy issues? I thought I had everything covered, but if you found something concerning it’d be nice to know before I get it out of beta :)
Show threadPoliteDudeInTheMood6d ago
  • Fixed credential-exfiltration risk in /api/proxy/image: Previously the endpoint could:
    • accept arbitrary auth_id
    • load stored API keys
    • forward them to attacker-controlled URLs
  • Enforced outbound host allowlist globally Previously:
    • allowlist existed
    • but outgoingFetch() didn’t enforce it
    • plugins/engines could bypass it
  • Fixed extension store path traversal Previously a malicious store manifest could:
    • inject … paths
    • escape install directories
    • reference arbitrary files
  • Hardened proxy IP trust Previously:
    • rate limiting trusted any X-Forwarded-For header
    • clients could spoof their IP
  • Fixed inconsistent settings authentication Previously:
    • settings UI stored an auth token
    • but the settings modal didn’t send it when saving
  • Implemented Improved proxy deployment support
    • Added proxy-aware behavior:
    • DEGOOG_PUBLIC_BASE_URL for canonical URLs
    • secure cookie handling when X-Forwarded-Proto=https

    Additional Improvements:

    • suggestion fetching hardened
    • DuckDuckGo suggestion parsing fixed
    • unified outbound request handling
    • install state guard properly cleaned up
    Show threadfccview6d ago

    Thanks, I’ll individually look into all of these ♥️ I’ll say some of them are more conscious compromises for the sake of an open scalable system where third party extensions can truly edit anything (intentionally) and everything around Auth/secure cookie is also fairly lax due to the fact the Auth is just a protection for the settings (which literally stop the settings from being served by the client), in the moment I decide to add some more structured Auth system/maybe users I’ll look into proper secure cookie handling.

    This is an awesome report, thank you so much for sharing it!!!

    Show threadfccview9h ago

    Hey sorry for the delay, dealing with a lot right now, but I didn’t forget about it.

    1 - Fixed this, the api key is now only forwarded if the destination hostname matches the plugin’s stored url. 2 - As I was saying, the allowlist is opt-in by design (null = allow all), and plugins legitimately need to make arbitrary outbound requests. Enforcing it globally would break the plugin system. 3 - Fixed this, it was quite simple 4 - I have added an env var (DEGOOG_DISTRUST_PROXY), if set to true it’ll make it so all users share the same rate limit regardless of their IPs, I left it as an opt in as most users currently running it are only keeping it private behind their own in house reverse proxies. This will be handy for a public instance for example 5 - Extension settings modal now correctly sends x-settings-token on save. 6 - As I said, auth is intentionally lax until a more structured auth system is added, may need to be a few weeks after stable is live, after all there’s no real auth and the setting password protected and private view should be secure enough as it is

    btw all this is not live yet, it’ll be sent live with the next release ♥