#eprint More Brisés in Ballet: Extending Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis by Emanuele Bellini, Gabriele Bellini, Alessandro De Piccoli, Michela Gallone, David Gerault, Yun Ju Huang, Paul Huynh, Matteo Onger, Simone Pelizzola, Andrea Visconti (https://ia.cr/2026/501)
More Brisés in Ballet: Extending Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis

In this work, we present new cryptanalytic results on the Ballet block cipher family, a simplified Lay-Massey ARX construction with a linear key schedule, winner of the symmetric algorithm category in the 2018–2020 Chinese National Cryptographic Algorithm Competition. Despite winning the competition, the cipher has received limited attention outside the Chinese Association for Cryptologic Research (CACR) community. We provide the first classical key recovery attacks in the literature, new explicit differential and linear trails (up to 15 rounds for differential, and 16 for linear, while the original paper only provided a bound for 9 rounds), improved impossible differential trails (8 rounds instead of 7), and the first differential-linear analysis of Ballet (up to 20 rounds). Our results lead to key recovery attacks on up to 16 rounds of Ballet-128/128/46 and 17 rounds of Ballet-128/256/48, thereby extending the cryptanalytic understanding of this ARX-based design and contributing new insight into its security margin, an area that the designers themselves note warrants further study.

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