@lumi Android's hardware-based attestation API would not cause these issues if it only had the pinning-based attestation we use as the basis for Auditor and omitted root-based attestation. The issue is having attestation roots which determine which hardware and operating systems are valid. Hardware-based attestation can be provided without any centralized authority determining which hardware and software is valid. It would still provide nearly all of what our Auditor app uses without roots.

@lumi We support hardware-based attestation based on pinning for protecting users against attacks. Root-based attestation has extremely weak security due to depending on the entire ecosystem of devices not having vulnerabilities enabling leaking keys chaining up to the root. Pinning-based attestation can be used as a very strong security feature. Check out our Auditor app. It does use the root-based attestation for first verification but it would provide most of what it does without it.

@lumi GrapheneOS supports the Android hardware-based attestation API. The API itself is a neutral approach which can support arbitrary roots of trust, non-stock operating systems verified based on verified boot key fingerprint and also has pinning-based attestation based on a proposal we made to Google before they stopped collaborating with us. Pinning-based attestation can be used with or without chaining up to a root for bootstrapping trust. It could exist without root-based attestation.