What’s Wrong with the Semantic Conception of Scientific Theories: Towards a Pragmatic View - Erkenntnis

In contrast to the syntactic conception of scientific theories, the semantic conception holds that theories are not statements about the world, but families of models. Recent debates have tended to blur the differences between these two views. Practice-oriented philosophers of science have also challenged both views on the ground that models are central to science, but autonomous from theories. However, they have not proposed any alternative. This article is an attempt to sharpen the challenges faced by the semantic view in order to pave the way for a truly pragmatic conception of theories. I examine different ways in which a focus on models could make the semantic view different from the syntactic view. In the end, they share the same resources to individuate theories, they account just as well for different layers of interpretation, and they face the same issues regarding the relation between formal representation and informal experience. I argue that the only relevant contrast lies not between linguistic and non-linguistic representation, but between descriptive and schematic representation, but this ultimately favours a pragmatic view by implying a role for context in theoretical interpretation. I sketch an account of schematic representation that could serve as a basis for a pragmatic conception of theories.