@dangoodin this problem has been solved for a while using symmetric encryption after a QR assymetric handshake for a while now, no?

@andrei_chiffa @dangoodin the issue is the size of the handshake itself. You have to run the entire handshake before you can transmit data. With PQC, what used to be a 32 to 256 byte public key or signature now each becomes 1 to 3.5 KB in size. This is acceptable for the key agreement parts, since we really only need one artifact per party there, but becomes way too expensive when talking about the certificate, i.e. a chain of public keys signed by keys further up.
Merkle Tree Certificates are a proposal that significantly compresses this certificate chain, at the cost of a more complicated trust management story.

@[email protected] it's ironic because CT logs were introduced because we didn't trust CAs. Now we should trust the CA, the cosigners, and the CT logs.

@[email protected] @[email protected]

@i @andrei_chiffa @dangoodin no, the CT logs still function as CT logs in mtc. They do away with the imperfection of CT logs requiring signatures instead of being published immediately, and they use the fact that the CT log itself can function as a certificate, but the trust model isn't relaxed, it's just more complicated.

@[email protected] what I'm trying to say is: the number of moving parts, that I need to trust or verify is increasing. And that is not really comforting.

Am I missing something here?

@[email protected] @dangoodin