amiljkovicThe Ars article mentions: “Even when HTTPS is in place, an attacker can still intercept domain look-up traffic and use DNS cache poisoning to corrupt tables stored by the target’s operating system.” Not sure, but I think this could then be further used for phishing.
DNSSEC prevents that if set up properly.
This is an on-path attacker. In end-user DNS configurations, attackers can simply disable DNSSEC; it's 1 bit in the DNS response header ("yeah, sure, I verified this for you, trust me").
No, modern resolvers like systemd-resolved actually check the dnssec signatures on the client.
To check the DNSSEC signatures on the client, you have to do a full recursive lookup. You've always been able to run your own DNS cache, if you want your host to operate independently of any upstream DNS server. But at that point, you're simply running your own DNS server.
It's not necessarily equivalent to a recursive lookup, you can ask a cache for all the answers because you already know the root keys a priori. But yes, it does follow the entire chain of trust, that's the entire point of dnssec: if you don't do that the whole exercise is utterly pointless.
It's explicitly not the point of DNSSEC, which has for most of its entire existence been designed to be run as a server-to-server protocol, with stub resolvers trusting their upstream DNS servers.
I agree with you, though. It's utterly pointless.
Not true, RFC4035 says all security aware resolvers SHOULD verify the signatures. It's far from pointless when actually implemented. Don't dismiss a whole protocol just because some historical implementations have been half assed.