For my newsletter and blog, I wrote about how Apple's Lockdown Mode, once billed as an "extreme" security protection for iPhones, iPads, Macs and Watches, has passed a major real-world test by blocking the feds from accessing a journalist's phone.

Free to read; with additional words, advice, and guidance for paying subscribers: https://this.weekinsecurity.com/apple-lockdown-mode-once-an-extreme-security-protection-now-a-necessity-for-americans/

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Apple's Lockdown Mode: Once an 'extreme' security protection, now a necessity for Americans

An optional "extreme" security feature that Apple has baked-in to modern iPhones, iPads, Macs, and Watches has passed a significant real-world test.

~this week in security~

@zackwhittaker
Next they'll beat the phone owner till they unlock. See XKCD.

In UK you can be sent to jail for refusing to give up a password.

@zackwhittaker my dad had this turned on by accident. I wasted about half an hour troubleshooting his phone because all kinds of stuff seemed broken (like no Facetime, no attachment previews in iMessage) before it dawned on me it had to be Lockdown mode 😂

@zackwhittaker So the Lockdown Mode feature that reads “To connect your iPhone or iPad to an accessory or another computer, the device needs to be unlocked.” is doing something different than just ensuring that Settings > FaceID & Passcode > Allow Access When Locked > Accessories is set to Off?

The default for the Accessories setting is for it to be Off, so if the threat model is physical access is there a reason Lockdown Mode is better than just ensuring that setting is off?

@zackwhittaker it also raises the question of if this lockdown feature is doing something that is only relevant if you have a weak device password, and isn’t a benefit if you have a very strong alpha numeric device password?