RE: https://hachyderm.io/@miketheman/116008792409955286
When I say TOTP is phishable and webauthn (“passkeys”) isn’t, this is a real-world example of what I am talking about
RE: https://hachyderm.io/@miketheman/116008792409955286
When I say TOTP is phishable and webauthn (“passkeys”) isn’t, this is a real-world example of what I am talking about
@glyph TBF a properly functioning (mentioned because not all are, or all the time) password manager would’ve prevented this too.
Though yarp, passkeys make it categorically impossible. Wish I trusted them more! 😰
@glyph yea fair, I should keep my eyes out more for where they are an upgrade-with-fallback.
I /have/ seen them put to good use when stored inside 1P, which (IIUC) should mean they’ll also be proof against any sort of device loss.
Also, lol at clicking links in emails! Who does that. I mean I know who, but, it ain’t me that’s for sure.
@semanticist Yeah. My problems are just the user experience bits around managing them.
That's a big one. But also how they sync and where they are stored in a multi device world.
They are definitely technically good.
to your "wallet" account
What is that and where is it stored?
I have reasons to believe it is less reliable and/or trustworthy a backup solution than the one I use generally.
As for interop, its absence makes the use of passkeys rather less useful and safe with Qubes, where one could instead have an RPC protocol between qubes/VMs (this is a very standard thing on Qubes, it's how keepassxc & the like are intended to be used) such that the one requesting authentication never even has access to the key in any shape or form, but merely passes along the handshake request.
Similar things could be done with hardware devices requiring a particular procedure to be interacted with in administrative mode. Or a different machine over a dedicated SSH protocol (or just piped), etc.