To be clear, I don't have direct evidence or public reporting to corroborate what Troy is saying. I'll keep an eye out and share if and when more information comes to light.

But if you listened to this podcast episode @sawaba and I did on the subject 5 months ago with AJ Yawn, you won't be surprised that what Troy describes has probably been happening to various degrees for a while now: https://www.tenchisecurity.com/en/alice-in-supply-chains/episode-7-hoxz2

It is worth understanding that "independent" audit reports like SOC 2, even more so than security certifications, have very important economic incentive issues. They give auditees too much control over the process, and are most likely severely overrepresenting how secure third-parties are.

The auditors are chosen and paid for by the third-party, so their economic incentive is not to be thorough, truthful and provide those companies with tough love that leads them to be transparent about (and hopefully improve) their security posture.

The selling pitch and criteria for the auditor and compliance automation vendor selection by a third-party is, overwhelmingly, "we'll make you look good with your customers and close more deals, faster". As the podcast episode makes clear, there are little to no effective processes to desincentivize or punish those providers from misbehaving giving their customers an undeserved clean bill of health.

First parties I talk to give less and less weight to self-assessment questionnaires, trust centers and "independent" audits paid for by the third-party because of that. So the compliance automation and security audit and certification industry is destroying the very value it is promising to provide.

Original LinkedIN post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sieira_details-have-emerged-regarding-a-widespread-activity-7415394996184424449-CSzO

UPDATE: https://www.reddit.com/r/soc2/comments/1q7u90o/real_or_fake_the_delve_scandal_or_conspiracy/

Hey @jerry and @lerg ... seems like an interesting topic to discuss on the Defensive Security podcast! I know I would love to hear your thoughts on this.
@jerry @lerg this is the discussion @sawaba and I had on the topic: https://youtu.be/2-o78Xt7GAw?si=TLxhYYJwK8YGAVZr
Episode #13, January 2026 - Alice in Supply Chains Podcast

YouTube

@AlexandreSieira @jerry @lerg I've been asking around on how people use SOC 2s, as I've noticed the latest trend is having AI analyze them.

The question I've been asking is "how often does a SOC 2 kill a deal or contribute to killing a deal" and the answer seems to be "never".

So, what are we doing here? Where's the value aside from some imperceptible, unmeasurable, slight increase in confidence in the SOC 2 holder?

@AlexandreSieira @jerry @lerg I remember working for a vendor once, when one prospect on a sales call proudly stated that "all their vendors had SOC 2s - no exceptions"

We refused to go through SOC 2 but we're happy to share our standard packet of documentation on how we did security.

They bought anyway. It was all a bluff.

@sawaba @AlexandreSieira @lerg Speaking only from my experience, they were helpful in staving off client demands for contractual audit rights. I am pretty convinced few, if any, customers actually read the report. Most that did were mainly focused on the section covering the user entity controls, and the rest used it to look for anything in the report they could use as bargaining power or an excuse to terminate the contract. It's a big kabuki dance, and it's not terribly surprising to see shenanigans, though I haven't seen the bottom of this particular controversy - last I saw, it looked like it might still be a misunderstanding or has it been confirmed to be shenanigans?
@jerry @sawaba @AlexandreSieira @lerg I never had a client who knew about or requested we cover some specific trust principles
@g @sawaba @AlexandreSieira @lerg It was somewhat common for us. Different companies (mostly in the banking sector) seemed to have their own pet concerns about operating in the cloud, so we would have some that, for example, were fixated on tenant isolation/separation (i.e., how we made sure customer A couldn't hurt customer B, either through the hypervisor or through VPC local networks), others were super concerned about control plane resiliency, some were super concerned about zero day vulnerabilities on the control plane, and so on. Those, and a few others, were things that were much too fine grained/nuanced to be picked up in programs like soc2 or iso.
@jerry @sawaba @AlexandreSieira @lerg Oh yeah but in my experience the companies who cared about security went so far above and beyond SOC2, having the SOC2 didn't save us much time anyway.