The coming industrialisation of exploit generation with LLMs
https://sean.heelan.io/2026/01/18/on-the-coming-industrialisation-of-exploit-generation-with-llms/
The coming industrialisation of exploit generation with LLMs
https://sean.heelan.io/2026/01/18/on-the-coming-industrialisation-of-exploit-generation-with-llms/
> In the hardest task I challenged GPT-5.2 it to figure out how to write a specified string to a specified path on disk, while the following protections were enabled: address space layout randomisation, non-executable memory, full RELRO, fine-grained CFI on the QuickJS binary, hardware-enforced shadow-stack, a seccomp sandbox to prevent shell execution, and a build of QuickJS where I had stripped all functionality in it for accessing the operating system and file system. To write a file you need to chain multiple function calls, but the shadow-stack prevents ROP and the sandbox prevents simply spawning a shell process to solve the problem. GPT-5.2 came up with a clever solution involving chaining 7 function calls through glibc’s exit handler mechanism.
Yikes.
Tells you all you need to know around how extremely weak a C executable like QuickJS is for LLMs to exploit. (If you as an infosec researcher prompt them correctly to find and exploit vulnerabilities).
> Leak a libc Pointer via Use-After-Free. The exploit uses the vulnerability to leak a pointer to libc.
I doubt Rust would save you here unless the binary has very limited calls to libc, but would be much harder for a UaF to happen in Rust code.
The reason I value Go so much is because you have a fat dependency free binary that's just a bunch of syscalls when you use CGO_ENABLED=0.
Combine that with a minimal docker container and you don't even need a shell or anything but the kernel in those images.
Why would statically linking a library reduce the number of vulnerabilities in it?
AFAICT, static linking just means the set of vulnerabilities you get landed with won't change over time.
> Why would statically linking a library reduce the number of vulnerabilities in it?
I use pure go implementations only, and that implies that there's no statically linked C ABI in my binaries. That's what disabling CGO means.
What I mean is: There will be bugs* in that pure Go implementation, and static linking means you're baking them in forever. Why is this preferable to dynamic linking?
* It's likely that C implementations will have bugs related to dynamic memory allocation that are absent from the Go implementation, because Go is GCed while C is not. But it would be very surprising if there were no bugs at all in the Go implementation.