The next steps:

1. Add support for DNS-based persistent authentication: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist...

2. Allow the user to just publish their public key into that TXT record.

3. Cut out the middleman and do the authentication directly in the browser.

4. DANE

Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Challenge for Persistent DNS TXT Record Validation

This document specifies "dns-persist-01", a new validation method for the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol. This method allows a Certification Authority (CA) to verify control over a domain by confirming the presence of a persistent DNS TXT record containing CA and account identification information. This method is particularly suited for environments where traditional challenge methods are impractical, such as IoT deployments, multi- tenant platforms, and scenarios requiring batch certificate operations. The validation method is designed with a strong focus on security and robustness, incorporating widely adopted industry best practices for persistent domain control validation. This design aims to make it suitable for Certification Authorities operating under various policy environments, including those that align with the CA/ Browser Forum Baseline Requirements.

IETF Datatracker
DANE isn't going to happen, and if you want to tilt at that windmill, it's Chrome and Mozilla you need to pressure, not LetsEncrypt.

I mean, these are the steps that can bring it. And with Let's Encrypt as a safe fallback, it actually is feasible this time.

Long shot? Yes. But not impossible.

What's the incentive for individual sites or browsers to do this?

From the site's perspective, they're going to need to have a WebPKI certificate for the foreseeable future, basically until there is no appreciable population of WebPKI-only clients, which is years in the future. So DANE is strictly more work.

From the browser's perspective, very few sites actually support DANE, and the current situation is satisfactory, so why go to any additional effort?

In order for technologies to get wide deployment, they usually need to be valuable to individual ecosystem actors at the margin, i.e., they have to get value by deploying them today. Even stipulating that an eventual DANE-only system is better, it doesn't provide any benefit in the near term, so it's very hard to get deployment.

A fun note: I vibecoded a dumb thingy that monitors the top 1000 zones on the Tranco research list of popular zones for DNSSEC status:

https://dnssecmenot.fly.dev/

Obviously, the headline is that just 2% of the top 100 zones are signed (thanks to Cloudflare). But the funnier thing is: in 5+ months of letting this thing run, it's picked up just three changes to DNSSEC status among all the zones it monitors. The third happened just an hour or so ago, when Canva disabled DNSSEC.

dnssec-me-not: tracking DNSSEC adoption in top domains