We’ve been warning about this for literally three decades, ever since CALEA mandated wiretap-ready telecom infrastructure. And this is merely the latest example of how these dangerous interfaces can be turned against us by our adversaries.
https://mastodon.social/@fj/113253726161428151
Tl;dr: creating one-stop shopping for attackers is a bad idea.

Exploits of "lawful access" interfaces, such as the Chinese attack reported today by the WSJ, appeared almost immediately after they became standardized in the 90's. The most famous example is the case known as "the Athens Affair" https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-athens-affair .

It was a bad idea then, and still a bad idea now.

The Athens Affair

How some extremely smart hackers pulled off the most audacious cell-network break-in ever

IEEE Spectrum
The Athens Affair is interesting for a number of reasons, but it's particularly notable that the switch that was compromised didn't actually have the CALEA option installed from the factory (since it wasn't then required in Greece). But it was added through a software update (induced by the attacker), and then exploited.
Anyway, my "told you so" muscles are pretty weary at this point.
Also, I'd be remiss if I didn't note that all the reasons that "lawful access" features in telecom infrastructure are risky apply at least equally to the periodically revived proposals for "key escrow" backdoors in cryptographic systems. Fortunately, we've mostly held back the tide on those, but they come up every few years. It would be a security disaster if they're ever mandated.

Mandated wiretap interfaces and cryptographic backdoors are *expensive*, both in terms of money and, more importantly, exposure to risk. Worse, those burdens are borne inequitably.

Overall, almost no one is the subject of a lawful wiretap, even in places where wiretapping is an important investigative tool. Most people aren't suspects. But these mandates degrade security (and impose other costs) for *everyone*, the vast majority of whom will never be wiretapped.

@mattblaze The other area of focus that people are missing, with the same foundational arguments, are our OS and Phone makers spying on us for advertisement reasons. While these companies lament that making backdoors for gov is impossible, they've certainly put forth a solid effort to syphon the same data for their revenue. All this data should be protected in both cases; but people, I feel, have lost sight and subsequently control of their data by these companies.

After all, they are the ones buying, selling, trading and loosing our data on a daily basis. I'm less concerned now with the gov backdoor concerns than what is being forced to coerced by big tech.

@dntlookbehindu Well, of course that's a huge concern, too. But these are additive risks. We don't have to only worry about one.

And it's not the government abusing its legal access I'm worried about here (that's a different question). It's that the architectural burden that implementing it imposes makes everything vulnerable to *illegal* access. As with adware, too.

@mattblaze I'm feeling we are past the architectural burden for this stuff when my phone see's an encrypted Singal conversation, and provides a popup of "do you want this translated from XX to English" without my permission or request (and no foreign language being used as well). The companies are screen scraping our encrypted conversations with poor AI systems, and turning their data into business transactions.

In short, I feel these companies have already made the backdoors and related infrastructure, and the malware, doing so under the color of adtech and revenue. All the keystroke loggers, screen scrapers, etc.

@dntlookbehindu Certainly true. But surveillance design mandates mean there's no way out - it becomes illegal to create or market a secure alternative.
@mattblaze aaaah i see your point now. Okay. Where I'm really concerned then is that big tech has demonstrated they can do it to the gov... and I don't know whose box is being opened now... Pandora's or Schrodinger's.