1/ Russian commentators say that Russia is losing parity in the drone war with Ukraine. They blame old-fashioned military commanders, the takeover of drone development by state contractors, and a dysfunctional military procurement system which prioritises loyalty over competence. ⬇️
2/ The "Chronicle of a UAV Operator" Telegram channel has posted a commentary assessing why Ukraine has gained UAV superiority over Russia. The UAV Operator highlights the push for "monopolisation, standardisation and simplification", which he says has been counter-productive.
3/ He blames the fixation of Russian military decision-makers on old military techologies: "Those who made such decisions can be understood, because these steps are the three pillars of the old technological school, where the Kalashnikov assault rifle, the Mosin rifle and the RPG warhead live. But these same three reasons are the basis for defeat in the technological paradigm, ...
4/ ...where FPV [drones], Mavics [drones], new means of communications, new means of reconnaissance, unmanned surface vessels and foam plastic long-range aircraft live."
He points out that Ukraine's senior decision-makers are much younger than those of Russia: "the enemy's decision-makers are aged from 35 to 55 years. They all played CS [Counter-Strike] and Dota [Defense of the Ancients]!"
5/ "It is easier for them to understand the difference between a smartphone and a radio station. It is easier for them to introduce Agile principles into the ministry's management and create a whole project office with a process acceleration function, it is easier for them to implement a matrix management structure. And they can do it not by word of mouth, locally, in one single corporation, but introduce it everywhere without any ‘islands of safety’ for top officials."
6/ The UAV Operator notes that in contrast to Ukraine's rapid and diffused approach to developing and producing drones with the aid of start-ups and volunteer engineers, in Russia well-connected companies have taken over the field and driven out the volunteer enthusiasts:
7/ "We lost the engineering school. Connected companies appeared, to which funding and orders were transferred. All the enthusiasts who could integrate into the system at the initial stage of the Special Military Operation and start making new technological miracle weapons were abandoned, left without money and forced to leave the industry. Some went to war, some went into business, some went back to work."
8/ "The 'systems' engineers remained on the payroll of high-precision corporations of the old technological paradigm. They are good guys, but their competence, as it turned out, is insufficient and they are all from a completely different field. The people's engineering front, which spontaneously formed in the first months of the war, has now practically collapsed – this is primarily due to the lack of money and support."
9/ "With every new drone that comes to us for reverse-engineering, we see the enemy's diversity of solutions expand. From the assembly culture, from the handwriting, we see that all these products are assembled by different teams. There are so many manufacturers on the other side that there is no talk of any standardisation. It is clear that the competencies of the new technological war are being protected there, cultivated and attracted from abroad."
10/ According to the blogger, the state's revenue stream for developing drones has been captured by existing large manufactuers, making it pointless for the Russian government to dump "helicopter money" into the sector:
"Detachment of the source of funds from those who make drones and for whom they are made puts an end to the whole idea. The main money will go to professional grant recipients and that's it. It's not important what you do, it's important that the grantors like your project."
11/ "My comrades and I look at the enemy drone fleet and ask ourselves, if they were to work for the front, for their Ukrainian victory would they have to pound the thresholds of local [government initiatives]? How many Sharks, Chaklunovs, Leleks, Bekovs, Bobrovs, Deltas, Transitovs, Sinikhs and a whole sea of noname FPV drones would they have invented and made?"
12/ Another Russian milblogger, Roman Alekhine, agrees with the general complaint of the UAV Operator and adds that a major problem lies in the culture of Russian state administration. He says that it "is built on three pillars: snatch, dump responsibility, including through a report with 10 signatures, simplify the focus of management to one loyal individual. There is also the main rule for the pillars – loyalty is higher than professionalism."
13/ Transferring management of drone procurement to the Russian armed forces would not work either, in Alekhine's view. "Maybe this is correct in one of the management models – but not in ours. The thing is that at this level, in most cases, management is not built better, there is no control, no responsibility, and no evaluation of the commander's work, which leads to the fact that he himself does not understand how to manage."
14/ "Some bosses say that it is necessary to preserve personnel, but a day later an order comes to make an unprepared attack on well-defended enemy positions, with the prefix: "Colonel (and further down the line: lieutenant colonel, major, captain, lieutenant), I don't care how you do it, but you must take it tomorrow.""
15/ He says that the systems "are set up in such a way as to avoid responsibility. The official who must make a decision is not ready to make a decision, since he can be accused of favouring his own people. Because of this, they drag each project through 10 commissions, each with several signatures–- these are like witnesses that everything is honest. This is how they've been brought up by the system, and the Ministry of Defence system has not accepted alternatives yet."
16/ The system also favours cheapness over quality or effectiveness, according to the 'Russian Engineer' channel. (This may be related to the frequent tendency of Russian defence contractors to boost their profits by charging excessive fees for cheap components.)
17/ The channel comments that "the flawed logic of reducing the cost of the product 'at any cost' does not allow improving the quality of the drone's FPV, not as a reworked toy, but as a combat product. That is, additional elements are additional expenses, which increases the cost.
But the procurement system thinks – wow, how expensive, but others make it much cheaper. So we'll buy from them."
18/ "And hence drones appear that do not pass quality control, do not have additional systems for detonation, with cheaper components that reduce the probability of hitting by two or three times, and at a shorter range.
As a result, the cost of hitting the target increases, but on paper, there is savings."
19/ Alekhine recommends establishing flexible financing for "a smart network structure for UAV development (in electronic warfare, it is about the same), which will unite UAV operators at the front with the centre."
20/ "Production [lines] should be built according to Toyota technology [i.e. the Kanban management system] with quick changeover, with the creation and support of logistic chains of both materials and components and finished products to the front. There should not be large contracts and large batches – this is the meaning of work in the constantly changing conditions of combat operations." /end
Sources:
🔹 https://t.me/xronikabpla/7479
🔹 https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/11104
🔹 https://t.me/rusengineer/4885
Хроника оператора БпЛА
Мы теряем паритет в войне дронов
Процесс начался больше двух лет назад, когда мы сами заложили «основы» этих потерь. Напомню, речь о сделанных шагах в сторону монополизации, стандартизации и упрощения. Тех кто принимал такие решения можно понять, ведь эти шаги это три кита старой технологической школы, где живет автомат Калашникова, винтовка Мосина и выстрел РПГ. Но эти же три причины есть основа поражения в технологической парадигме, где живут FPV, Мавики, новые средства связи, новые средства разведки, БЭКи и пенопластовые дальнолеты.
Есть много гипотез почему противник быстро перестроился, а мы нет. Но самую яркую озвучили коллеги из президентского федерального кадрового резерва для высших постов. По понятным причинам, они вряд ли скажут ее открыто, но я ее озвучу: у противника возраст лиц, принимающих решения от 35 до 55 лет. Они все играли CS и Доту! Им проще понять разницу между смартфоном и радиостанцией. Им проще ввести в управление министерства принципы Agile и создать целый проектный офис с функцией…
ChrisO_wiki
Paladin 
Toni Aittoniemi