ChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024

1/ The Russian publication Chest' imeyu ("I have the honour") has published an interesting commentary on "Tactics of infantry attacks in the Ukrainian war based on the experience of 2022-2023". It discusses the challenges of trench warfare in Ukraine.

The article, written by Andrey Markin and published in the journal's January 2024 edition, highlights the practical difficulties for both sides of assaulting positions located in narrow belts of trees along the sides of Ukraine's wide fields. ⬇️

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2/ Markin writes:

"Materials on the tactics of attacks used, which have become publicly available, demonstrate at least three "oddities" of infantry attacks in the current war aimed at capturing enemy positions in the trenches:

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
3/ 1) in the immediate vicinity of the attacked trenches, soldiers of the attacking side move almost at full height at a slow (!) pace, often freezing (!) in place to fire 3-7 meters from the enemy trench. When stopping their movement, they do not always move to the "lying down" position in the immediate vicinity of the enemy trenches, often taking the "kneeling" or "kneeling" position or remaining in the "standing" position, barely ducking down;
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4/ 2) the assault almost always proceeds along the trench, and not frontally;

3) the approach to the attacked trench is carried out "in single file", that is, practically in a column, one at a time, without deploying in a chain (wedge), and often such a "column" in front of the enemy trench gathers into a small crowd, when the leading soldiers of the column stop, and those walking behind continue to move forward until they catch up with the soldiers who stopped in front.

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
5/ If disembarking is carried out from an APC/BMP then it is carried out 10-20 meters from the enemy trench (when disembarking from the stern of an BMP, the side of the vehicle is often positioned approximately parallel to the trench line, i.e. the infantry behind the stern does not take cover at the moment of dismounting; not to mention the fact that soldiers often sit on top of the armoured vehicle during the approach), ...
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024

6/ ...and the dismounted soldiers then approach the attacked trench in a "crowd", without moving to the lower level.

All this indicates that the density and effectiveness of the defenders' fire in front of the forward edge of the defence is extremely low, otherwise the above actions would be simply impossible.

For the purposes of further discussion, this method of completing an attack will be called a "single column attack", although the conventionality of this term is clear.

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
7/ To appreciate the non-standard nature of what is happening, it must be understood that none of the tactical schools existing in the world provided for the possibility of completing an attack in this way. In essence, all "regulation" methods of completing an attack can be classified into three groups:
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024

8/ a) a running throw in a chain, often after a volley of grenades, accompanied by automatic fire from the hip (conventionally the "Soviet method", the British had a generally similar method);

b) a quick step in a chain with shooting off the cuff from short stops for aiming (conventionally "pre-Vietnam American", the Bundeswehr had a generally similar method);

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
9/ c) crawling along a corridor that is not under fire, i.e. crawling into a trench after placing (not throwing) a grenade into it, while suppressive fire is conducted to the right and left of the entry point, and subsequently mopping up the trench from the inside with reinforcements passing through the same corridor that is not under fire (the so-called "Canadian" method, a generally similar method is now used by the Americans, only not 1, but 2 soldiers roll into the trench at the same time).
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10/ Leaving aside the question of the conditions for the applicability of one or another method, let us note that none of them provides for a long walk at full height ("sticking") in front of an enemy trench, and even going in a crowd.
Jul 17, 2024 at 7:15pmWeb
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
11/ This is quite understandable - according to classical views on tactics, the zone in the immediate vicinity of the enemy trench is the most dangerous due to the possibility of the defence to conduct oblique (flank) fire, especially if this fire is 'dagger' fire, and at the moment of the greatest vulnerability of the attackers (in English-speaking sources such fire approximately parallel to the line of trenches in their immediate vicinity is called fire along the "final protective line").
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024

12/ The ability of the defence to throw grenades in volleys and the fact that the attackers are close to the defender's trenches also plays a role, making them relatively easy targets to hit.

It should also be noted that being in a column during a battle is considered unacceptable, since in this case the unit is at risk of coming under longitudinal (enfilade) fire from machine guns along the column, the increased effectiveness of which is known.

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
13/ The author of these lines explained walking “in single file” as follows: if you walk in a chain, then a burst from a machine gun will knock out the entire chain, and if you go “in single file,” then only the first few soldiers in the column will be hit, and the rest will be able to lie down.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
14/ The contradiction of this explanation with the entire world military experience accumulated before the Special Military Operation only shows that the factor of fire from small arms in current conditions is of little significance when choosing the formation of attackers.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
15/ Here we should also note that materials appearing in the public domain demonstrate an almost complete disregard for the “regulation” methods of attack, on both sides. This applies to both Russian (modified Soviet) methods and the notorious NATO standards (platoon hasty attack battle drill and its equivalents) in the Ukrainian version.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
16/ The question of why this happens is beyond the scope of this article. This can be explained by the low level of training of military personnel, by the inconsistency of the conditions for applying the regulation methods to the current situation, and by the low realism/incomprehensibility of the training process, when after the classes, overloaded with regulation methods, the trainee understands only that it is impossible to act in the way he is taught.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
17/ From the practical point of view of the regulations it can be said that there are none. This issue deserves separate consideration and, to repeat, is beyond the scope of this article, especially since it has the potential to undermine the entire training system based on the authority of the combat manuals.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
18/ Given the conspicuous disconnect between combat practice and the normative requirements of governing documents, it seems practically important to focus on two facets of the problem: 1) the causes of the spread of "attacks in a column one at a time"; 2) changes in tactics and training associated with the spread of "one-by-one attacks in a column."
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
19/ Of course, the easiest thing to do would be to dismiss the emerging combat practice and attribute the emergence of "attacks in a column one at a time" to the combination of untrained troops and ordinary stupidity. However, this does not seem quite correct. There are some objective factors. Let us consider them.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
20/ 1) The fact that most positions are located in wooded areas with large fields between them (1-1.5 km between plantations) or in forests results in the fact that to establish an effective oblique (flank) fire system requires so much work is needed to clear sectors of fire that it is simply impossible to do so given the available forces and time.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
21/ The field in front of the plantation is well covered, but the enemy who enters the forest plantation disappears from sight of the flanking defensive firepower. In order to allow such firepower to penetrate the area in front of the clearing, it must be moved outside the clearing and made easily detectable and, consequently, destroyed. In certain cases, clearing sectors for oblique fire is actually undesirable, as the camouflage properties of forest plantations will be lost.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
22/ On the other hand, for attackers there is almost always a convenient hidden approach to the flank of the defended position either along a perpendicular forest plantation, or from the opposite side of such a perpendicular forest plantation farthest from the forest plantation where the defender is located.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
23/ Forest plantations greatly complicate the fire means of supporting the defenders from the rear, since the attackers are poorly visible from the tactical depth - the same forest plantation in which the defenders’ trenches are located is in the way. Taking the trenches out of the forest plantation and placing them in an open field is hampered by the increased ability to observe and adjust artillery fire using UAVs and, to some extent, the use of ammunition drop systems from UAVs.
Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
24/ If trenches are not almost completely covered from above (and there are simply not enough materials, as well as time and effort resources to do so), those in such a trench will be knocked out rather quickly. It is quite problematic to return to the practice of canopies over trenches, which was practised in the First World War, precisely because of the lack of resources in the broad sense of the word for their construction.
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25/ In addition, it was noted as early as the early 20th century that canopies interfered with the use of trenches as a starting point for attacks, limiting their usefulness. Canopies were subsequently abandoned.

Defence in a forest plantation can be compared with defence at the edge of a forest, but the problem is that positions are not usually recommended on the edge of the forest, but rather in the depths of the forest.

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024

26/ However, in the case of forest plantations, these recommendations do not apply. There is simply no depth.

It seems that the current war has once again created a situation that some rules, which were considered universal, turned out to be inapplicable in a particular case.

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024

27/ 2) The second factor is the insufficient attention paid by the guiding documents to the preparation of a defensive position for close defensive combat at ultra-short ranges.

Traditionally, defensive positions are prepared based on the need to stop enemy attacks at relatively distant ranges. Doctrinally, there are two approaches to the remoteness of such lines.

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024

28/ The domestic tradition is based on opening fire on the attacking enemy as he approaches the range of actual fire from the defenders’ weapons, i.e. practically at the maximum range for the given conditions.

Tactical views in a number of foreign countries (for example, the German tactical school) prescribe opening fire when the attackers enter the zone of maximum effectiveness of the defender's fire, i.e. practically from 100-150 metres.

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29/ This range of opening fire, in addition to using the effect of a sudden close fire attack, significantly limits the support of attackers with heavy weapons fire due to the proximity of friendly soldiers to the positions of the defending enemy.

But in both approaches, the defensive positions are designed to stop the attack primarily at a distance.

Show threadChrisO_wikiJul 17, 2024
30/ The expectation is that the attackers will usually refuse to continue the attack if they suffer significant losses during the advance phase. Little attention is paid to defensive combat at distances of 3-7 metres, when the attacking enemy has managed to get to an ultra-short distance.