come chat with us online, your options are:

- unencrypted faang client
- other unencrypted faang client
- other other unencrypted faang client
- encrypted faang client that is likely backdoored
- $20 profile microtransactions and constantly changing UX
- client with optional encryption and requires a phone number
- encrypted by default client that also requires a phone number
- 35 year old protocol lacking a lot of QOL features that people still use for some reason
- 25 year old protocol that nobody can agree on which extensions to use
- "unable to decrypt message"

@Jenetrix I'll play devils advocate here and point two things. Encryption for public chatrooms doesn't provide any benefits, it's a public room already. Secondly, e2ee solutions if you don't verify identities/keys out of band provide no security either, you might be being mitm-ed and you won't know it unless you verify each other.

So it's important to note what your usecase is.

@erethon @Jenetrix I wouldn't necessarily characterize all multiuser chat platforms as "public;" there are plenty of use cases where you have a community chat, but you wouldn't want an uninvited third party intercepting the discussion — marginalized people living under oppressive regimes but wanting or needing to find community springs to mind.

(That said, keeping multiuser plaintext comms off the platform operator's system gets into complicated key management problems, as you touch upon.)

@jima I agree, not all multi-user rooms are meant to be public, my comment was specifically about public/open-for-everyone-to-join rooms where encryption doesn't provide any benefits.

Besides the key management problems, another common failure I've seen in various circles is people feeling they're in a safe environment because the chat is e2ee, while also having threat actors (i.e. cops) in the room that can read all messages. As the number of people in a room increases, things get harder.

@erethon I would still disagree that encryption provides no benefits, even in the context of open-to-the-public chat.

Just because a chat room can be publicly joined doesn't mean you necessarily want anyone who can sniff your packets to know you're in that chat room, thereby enabling them to join and snoop more directly.

Agreed on the false sense of safety point, however! Definitely worth bearing in mind.

@jima You're right and I'm guilty of thinking of some things in an absolute way or making some assumptions.

For example, I assume that the packets are encrypted and people sniffing network traffic won't see your messages. In this context encryption was only meant as e2ee and not transport encryption.

I'm also guilty of thinking this mainly in Matrix terms, where [server admins](https://blog.erethon.com/blog/2022/07/13/what-a-malicious-matrix-homeserver-admin-can-do/) have so much power and there's so much metadata in the "clear" that complicates things.

What a malicious matrix homeserver admin can do

@erethon OK, fair! On the e2ee & "public" chats front, totally agreed.